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Summary 
When Thomas Craig (c.1538-1608) wrote his great treatise on Scottish feudal practice, the 
Jus feudale, he devoted a considerable part of the first book to legal origins. This article deals 
with Craig’s treatment narrative on the origins of feudal law and tenure in the fourth and fifth 
titles of the first book. By close examination of the text, the detailed formulation of Craig’s 
argumentation and technique is uncovered as well as the myriad classical, mediaeval and 
humanist sources upon which his literary project was based. In this way, the deep relationship 
between Craig – and by extension Scots law – and the historico-legal product of the French 
legal humanists is explored. 
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Introduction 
 A fascination with origins is one of the features distinguishing the humanists of the 
Renaissance from their mediaeval predecessors. When jurists in the early sixteenth century 
first began to apply humanist methodologies to the study of law, they imported this 
characteristic to their own sphere; but for lawyers in particular the impetus to excavate the 
true origins and sources of law was innate to their profession.1 Within any system or structure 
that derives its authority from precedent, origins matter. The purpose of this article is to 
examine the account of the origins of feudal law and tenure given by the Scottish jurist 
Thomas Craig in the Jus feudale. By examining the intersection of feudal legal theory and 
humanist historical technique in the Jus feudale, we will arrive at a better understanding how 
Craig’s work relates to the larger body of European legal humanist and feudal legal literature.  
 
 The historiographical approach taken by the legal humanists was relatively intuitive. 
They construed contemporary juristic structures as linked with the original context or 
circumstances in which the earliest form of those structures had emerged. Law, as they saw it, 
had a point of origin at which it had come into existence and from that point it evolved and 
developed over time adding new elements and adapting existing ones; the ways in which law 
and legal structures had evolved were informative for their interpretation and application of 
the contemporary structure.2 In other words, the feudal past necessarily influenced the feudal 
present. Living legal structures could be understood only by close study of their origins and 
the historical process of juristic adaptation in the face of changing social, political and 
economic circumstances. A contemporary articulation of this principle is provided by the 
legal humanist François Baudouin who remarked that, “jurisprudence must be joined with 
history and thereby reduced to fixed law.”3 The legal structures of feudal law had therefore to 
                                                 
1 D.R. Kelley, De origine feudorum: the beginnings of an historical problem, Speculum 39 (1964), p.207-228, 
at 208 
2 Cf. P.A. David, Why are institutions the “carriers of history”?: path dependence and the evolution of 
conventions, organizations and institutions, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 5 (1994), p.205-
220, at 214-215. 
3 [A]d certum ius recurrendum est et cum historia coniungenda est iurisprudentia. F. Baudouin, De 
be studied from genesis down to contemporary application with particular attention paid to 
their reception and adaptation in different historical periods.4 History was the scholarly 
articulation of society’s life cycle and historical events had to be interpreted not just for the 
generalised lessons they might impart but for their capacity to explain how present reality 
came about in the first place and to explicate the means and process by which past had 
evolved to present. Humanist writers of the sixteenth century were, as Kelley says, interested 
in “the living legacy of the past”, not in the “archaeology” of dead literature.5  
 
 For Thomas Craig, then, as a legal humanist,6 the study of feudal history was not an 
end in itself but a means of creating a written institution of living Scots feudal law and 
practice. That was the core function of his historiographical project. While the Jus feudale 
was, as the name says, a book on feudal law, Craig applied the legal humanist historical 
model in a much wider way. In treating the origins of the feudal law, Craig did not begin with 
the early middle ages when feudal practice first appeared; instead, he went back to Bible to 
seek the earliest origins of all human law.7 From there he traced the development of law from 
Moses and the Israelites through Egypt and then Greece and Rome,8 thence to the law 
schools of France where it was passed to Scots students in one long process of translatio 
studii.9 Craig was not looking for mere historical precedent for any particular feudal rule, but 
                                                 
institutione historiae universae et eius cum iurisprudentia coniunctione, Paris 1561, p.104 
4 D.R. Kelley, The rise of legal history in the renaissance, History and Theory, 9 (1970), p.174–94, at 187 and 
192–3. 
5 D.R. Kelley, “Fides historiae”: Charles Dumoulin and the Gallican view of history, Traditio, 22 (1966). 
p.347–402, at 348. 
6 ‘Humanist’ (humanista in Latin, following the mediaeval legista and canonista) is a period term coined by 
the humanists themselves to describe someone committed to the liberal arts (or studia humanitatis) of 
classical Rome. Over time, the humanists developed a variety of methodologies and techniques for the study 
and recovery of ancient learning. The term ‘legal humanists’ is used here to describe the classically-educated 
lawyers who, beginning with Alciato, began to apply humanist methodologies to the study of law (a process 
they knew as the mos gallicus or French method in opposition to the mediaeval mos italicus or Italian 
method). 
7 On this, see L. Dodd, Thomas Craig’s aetiology of law and society: literary dependence and independence 
in the Jus Feudale, Journal of Legal History, 37 (2016), p.121–79, at 127-130. 
8 Ibid., passim. 
9 J.D. Ford, Law and opinion in Scotland during the seventeenth century, Oxford 2007, p.211-216 and 222-
223. 
for an authoritative genealogy of the entire concept of law; and any such search demonstrated 
the ways in law was constantly being adapted to fit new and changing circumstances. It has 
been said of humanist history that “in contrast to the universalistic claims of philosophy, [it] 
afforded access to the ‘local knowledge’ associated with a ‘usable past’.”10 It is very easy to 
see why such a model of historical inquiry would be attractive to feudal lawyers, why a form 
of history that communicated and explained specifically local usages would have value for 
someone whose professional life was intimately involved with the feudal law, itself a juristic 
system the expression of which was explicitly local and therefore customary.11 Customary 
law posed certain issues for those utilising humanist literary methodologies, precisely 
because the humanist method was predicated upon the existence of literature, that is of 
textual artefacts, that could be studied, analysed and fixed (in both senses of that word). 
Customary law, however, emerged not from written legal codes but from practical exercises 
in solving legal problem and resolving disputes. Fortunately for Craig, by the time he began 
treating this subject, there already existed a great body of predominantly French historico-
legal literature discussing in detail the localised application of feudal law, the origins of 
feudal tenure and the relationship between feudal and learned law. This was the intellectual 
heritage of the Jus feudale, both the juristic canvas upon which Craig’s product was set down 
and the scholarly inspiration for his own work. 
 
 Charles Dumoulin had published “the first comprehensive history of feudalism” in 
1539;12 some forty years later, in 1579, there were sufficient works in circulation on the topic 
                                                 
10 D.R. Kelley, Renaissance humanism, Boston 1991, p.96 
11 Jus Feudale 1.11.19, “[T]he feudal law is local and frequently varies according to location” ([J]us feudale 
locale est et pro diversitate locorum saepissime variatur); cf. also Stair, The Institutions of the Law of 
Scotland, Edinburgh 1693, p.451: “the feudal law, as hath oftentimes been said…is local”. Kelley quotes 
Bartolus as saying “Today feudal law is nothing but custom set down in writing” (D.R. Kelley, Clio and the 
lawyers: forms of historical consciousness in medieval jurisprudence, Medievalia et Humanistica, 5 (1974), 
p.25-49 at 35); his exact citation is unclear to the present author, but the source appears to be Commentaria 
in primam digesti veteris partem (Basel 1589), p.57 (consuetudo feudorum sit in scriptis redacta) or p.64 
(usus feudorum, qui sunt consuetudines, sunt redacti in scriptis). 
12 Kelley, The rise of legal history (supra, n.4), p.189 
that the Italian humanist and feudist Marino Freccia felt it necessary to produce a summary of 
the opinions of contemporary feudal historical writers.13 The effect of so many differing 
historico-legal interpretations was to underline the complexity and variety of European feudal 
customs and traditions and to inspire lawyers like Craig in their efforts at establishing 
authoritative accounts of their own local customs. If we do no more than note the number of 
writers and texts explicitly cited in the Jus feudale, it is abundantly clear that Craig was part 
of and dependent upon a much larger historiographical tradition which served as inspiration, 
model and frame for his own studies into Scotland’s legal history.14 While the scale of his 
achievement and originality of his analysis mean that he fully warrants being recognised as a 
significant legal humanist scholar in his own right and the father of Scots institutional and 
legal historiography, he was not the inventor, discoverer or originator of historical inquiry 
into the origins of feudal law and tenure.15 Indeed, the earliest attempt to uncover the 
historical origins of the feudal law was that of Baldus and therefore pre-dates both humanism 
and the Renaissance.16 Within a specifically Scottish context, there were clear attempts to 
locate and define the origins of feudal tenure as early as the mid-fourteenth century. Both in 
the Leges Malcolmi Mackenneth and in the Chronica gentis Scotorum of John of Fordun, we 
find accounts that involve King Malcolm II giving away all his land to the barons, in return 
for wardship and relief, while keeping for himself only the moot hill (or mound of pleas) at 
Scone.17 Craig was thus neither the first humanist nor the first lawyer nor even the first Scot 
to attempt to give an account of the origins of feudal tenure and law. He was merely the latest 
                                                 
13 M. Freccia, De subfeudis baronum et inuestituris feudorum. Venice, 1579; cf. Kelley, De origine feudorum 
(supra, n.1), p.210 
14 Douglas Osler has pointed out that Europe in this period was so riven by political and religious differences 
that scholars could and did work in complete ignorance of the efforts of colleagues in other countries (D. 
Osler, The Fantasy Men, Rechtsgeschichte, 10 (2007), p.169-190 at 184). Craig, of course, was wholly 
conscious of and to a large extent reliant on the literary product of French legal humanists. 
15 Kelley observes a disheartening tendency to ignore the pre-Enlightenment historiographical contribution 
which, amongst other things, has led to the myth that Montesquieu originated the idea of feudalism in 
L’esprit des lois; see Kelley, De origine feudorum (supra, n.1), p.207. 
16 Ibid., p.214; see also Kelley, Clio and the lawyers (supra, n.11), p.25-26 on the “historical consciousness” of 
mediaeval lawyers. 
17 H.L. MacQueen, Tears of a legal historian: Scottish feudalism and the ius commune, Juridical Review, 1 
(2003), p.1-28, at 21; and H.L. MacQueen, Common law and feudal society in medieval Scotland, Edinburgh 
2016, p.86. 
in a long line of legal thinkers to approach the topic. 
 
The ancestry of the feudal law: competing theories 
 
 The origins and development of law form a significant part of the first book of the Jus 
feudale.18 The first title treats the emergence of law and legal processes in the earliest human 
societies while the second and third title deal with the Roman and canon law respectively. It 
is in the fourth title that Craig discusses the genesis of feudal law and tenure. This is 
followed, in the fifth title, by a very short refutation of those who ascribe a Roman origin to 
the feudal law. The sixth deals with the origins of written institutions of feudal law, meaning 
the Libri feudorum, the twelfth-century Lombard text which served as the principle written 
source on feudal custom.19 Titles seven and eight deal respectively with the feudal law’s 
arrival and application in the British Isles. In other words, approximately half of the first 
book deals with matters that might be described as introducing the history of law rather than 
the living law. One might have supposed that a practising lawyer would begin a study of the 
feudal law by discussing the key written institution of feudal law, the Libri feudorum, 
particularly in view of its influence on the development of Scots law,20 but Craig’s approach 
was typical of the humanist methodology. While his primary interest was certainly in living 
legal practice, he conceived of law as a phenomenon that could be understood only in terms 
of its full historical development. The proper starting point for a humanistic discussion of the 
feudal law was therefore with its origin.  
 
                                                 
18 A new English translation and Latin edition of the text has recently been published by the Stair Society: T. 
Craig, Jus feudale tribus libris comprehensum [=Stair Society, vol. 64], ed. & trans. L. Dodd, Edinburgh 
2017. 
19 The point has been well made that the Libri feudorum was a local Lombard text and we should be careful 
not to overestimate its influence (see D. Heirbaut, Feudal law in: The Oxford handbook of European legal 
history, H. Pihlajamäki, M.D. Dubber and M. Godfrey, Oxford 2018, p.529-548, at 538); but, even so, it 
served a useful function for early modern lawyers by providing a fixed point of reference. 
20 MacQueen, Common law (supra, n.17) p.117-118 and 264 
 The heading of the fourth title is De origine et progressu feudorum (“On the origin 
and development of feus”). This communicates something about about Craig’s understanding 
of and historiographical approach to the subject. In the first place, it indicates that law was to 
be understood as the product of an extensive process of historical evolution.21 Texts such as 
the Libri feudorum were themselves the result of this process and therefore could never be 
accurate guides to the earliest manifestations of feudal practice. The feudal law was 
construed as a tradition stretching from shadowy beginnings in the early middle ages all the 
way down to the Scotland in which Craig lived, worked and wrote. It had never been a fixed 
structure, but was instead adapted to meet the needs of particular places and periods; even the 
Jus feudale itself can be seen as a part of that process of legal evolution, that is, as an effort at 
defining and articulating “the amorphous mass of feudal customs” utilised by the civil courts 
of early modern Scotland and reducing them to a fixed, crystallised format.22 While all feudal 
law was fundamentally alike in that it used the same terminology to describe the same basic 
forms of tenure and service, the specifics varied enormously from century to century and 
from place to place.23 The Libri feudorum was therefore no more than the articulation of a 
developed system of feudal law and tenure in one specific place at one specific point in time. 
The true origin of the feudal law was much earlier. By Craig’s day, a number of competing 
humanist theories had emerged about the origins of feudal law and tenure, of which two are 
particularly important: one believed that the foundations of feudal law lay in the Roman 
empire and the other that they were to be found in ancient Germany. These theories formed 
the scholarly background to Craig’s work and to some extent circumscribed his engagement 
with the topic. 
 
                                                 
21 Cf. J.W. Cairns, T.D. Fergus & H.L. MacQueen, Legal humanism in renaissance Scotland, Journal of Legal 
History, 11 (1990) p.40-69 at 51–52; and H.L. MacQueen, Regiam majestatem, Scots law, and national 
identity, Scottish Historical Review, 74 (1995) p.1–25 at 15–16. 
22 D. Baird Smith, Sir Thomas Craig, Feudalist, Scottish Historical Review, 12 (1915), p.271-302, at 285 
23 G.L. Gretton, The feudal system, in: The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Edinburgh 1996, 
vol. 18, para. 44 
 The earliest iteration of the Romanist position was with Budé in his Annotationes in 
XXIV libros Pandectarum of 1508,24 “a sprawling collection of notes” on the first twenty-four 
books of Justinian’s Digest.25 Budé believed that the ancestor of the feudal system lay in the 
ancient Roman system of clientage, which involved individuals pledging themselves to 
powerful patrons as clients. The two would then be bound by informal sets of duties, rights 
and obligations. The patron became the client’s protector, providing legal representation, 
loans, political support and so on; the client, in turn, had to serve his patron as necessary, for 
example by voting for him in elections or paying ransom if the patron was captured. Each 
was bound to refrain from doing the other any harm. Superficially one can see that 
similarities existed between clientage in classical Rome and mediaeval vassalage, but, apart 
from that, the Romanist position provided feudal tenure with a prestigious historical 
pedigree.26 Under the Romanist position, feudal practice was not to be seen as a barbarous 
innovation of the middle ages but as a surviving aspect of the ancient world; for Renaissance 
humanists, to whom the mediaeval period was a dark age of ignorance, superstition and 
pedantry, the prospect of a classical origin for feudal law was obviously very attractive. Even 
for those who rejected Budé’s association of vassalage with clientage, a Roman genesis was 
still appealing because it made the feudal law into a descendant of the civil law and thus the 
intellectual progeny of imperial Rome. Cujas, probably the most famous of the French legal 
humanists, presented the next important iteration of the Roman theory;27 for him, feudal law 
and tenure descended not from clientage but from certain forms of perpetual tenure found in 
late Roman law.28 The ancestors of the mediaeval vassals were thus the actores, custodes and 
coloni of the Corpus iuris civilis. An opposing position was articulated by the Germanist 
                                                 
24 Kelley, De origine feudorum (supra, n.1), p.218 
25 K. Davis, Periodization and sovereignty: how ideas of feudalism and secularization govern the politics of 
time, Philadelphia 2008, p.35 
26 Kelley, De origine feudorum (supra, n.1), p.217 
27 On the life and works of Cujas generally, see X. Prévost, Jacques Cujas (1522-1590), jurisconsulte 
humaniste, Geneva 2015. 
28 Kelley, De origine feudorum (supra, n.1), p.219 
thesis first espoused in 1539 by Dumoulin in his treatise De feudis, a study of and 
commentary on Parisian customary practice; he was the first to discern a link between 
mediaeval vassalage and the armed tribal retinues (or comitatus) described by Tacitus in the 
Germania.29 Other theories arose – such as Connan’s which, drawing upon Caesar, attributed 
the beginnings of feudal tenure to the ancient Gauls – but the Germanist and Romanist 
paradigms had no serious competitors. When François Hotman came to publish his feudal 
commentary in 1573, he further developed the Germanist line and presented it in its 
“classical form”.30  
 
 Craig had read Dumoulin, Cujas and Hotman and indeed repeatedly mentions each by 
name, so, by the time he began writing the Jus feudale, he was fully conversant with these 
competing theories.31 Hotman, however, was far and away Craig’s favourite source on feudal 
law and history.32 Kelley has argued that the Germanist thesis in general, but particularly 
Hotman’s version, “was distorted by ideological bias” and articulates an avowedly religious 
message that exalts “the liberties and virtues of the Germans (by inference the Protestants) 
above the perfidious Romanists”; even the failure of Connan’s “gaulois theory” is explained 
                                                 
29 On Dumoulin generally, see Kelley, “Fides Historiae” (supra, n.5), p.352-356. 
30 Kelley, The rise of legal history (supra, n.4), p.190. While it is generally accepted that Hotman traced the 
concept of vassalage back to the tribal comitatus described by Tacitus, Pocock argued that Hotman was 
resistant to this idea (J.G.A. Pocock, The ancient constitution and the feudal law, Cambridge 1957, p.77-78). 
He bases this on a section of Hotman’s Disputatio de iure feudali (pp.17-19 in the 1574 Cologne edition of 
the De feudis commentatio tripartita, to which all future citations refer) where he believes that Hotman is 
stating that barbarian retainers could not be the ur-vassals of feudalism because, after settling in the empire 
and receiving allotments of land, they became unfree coloni bound to the land in the same manner as serfs. 
Since they were no longer free, their position could not be said to be analogous to that of feudal vassals. This 
is a rare instance where Pocock’s interpretation seems to be wide of the mark since Hotman is not, in fact, 
talking about comitatus at all but about actores, custodes and coloni. Specifically, he is attempting to refute 
“the opinion of those who argue that the origin of vassalage derives from the Roman law because in the 
books of the Codex mention is made of actores, custodes and especially coloni, to whom fixed lands were 
assigned them in perpetuity” (Superest eorum sententia, qui disputant vassalos propterea ex jure Romano 
sumpsisse, quoniam in libris Codicis mentio sit actorum, custodum et praecipue colonorum quibus agri certi 
ea conditione in perpetuum attributi erant). It is significant that Hotman does not actually use the word 
comitatus to describe those who became coloni; indeed, the most proximate appearance of the word 
comitatus is in the previous chapter, some five pages earlier (p.12). 
31 Despite this and other uses of Dumoulin, Sir John Skene was methodologically far closer to Dumoulin than 
Craig ever was; see Ford, Law and opinion (supra, n.9), p.264. 
32 J.W. Cairns, The breve testatum and Craig’s Ius feudale, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 56 (1988), 
p.311-332, at 330; D. Baird Smith, François Hotman, Scottish Historical Review, 13 (1916), p.328-365, at 
351-352. 
as a consequence of “the explosive anti-Romanist pressures of the wars of religion”.33 Such 
an interpretation is not without problems,34 but if we assume its  validity, then it would impart 
a religious dimension to the existing intellectual and cultural kinship which Craig clearly felt 
for French legal humanists and their literary product. The version of the feudal past expressed 
in the Jus feudale must be seen as part of the broad web of legal humanist thought; that is, as 
the function and expression of contemporary discourse, not as something subordinate to that 
discourse. Craig was no mere recorder of the opinions of others, but an insightful interpreter 
of history who drew upon the wider corpus of scholarly literature to articulate and 
contextualise his own work and thought. Pocock has rightly praised “the breadth and clarity 
of Craig’s historical thought”,35 but it is important that our reading of Craig also includes 
appreciation of the independence of his analysis. 
 
The Germania as feudal source 
 
 Like Hotman and Dumoulin, Craig believed that the origins of feudal practice lay in 
ancient Germany and his primary source on this topic was Tacitus’ Germania. The earliest 
echo of the feudal relationship between lord and vassal lay in the relationship between master 
                                                 
33 Kelley, The rise of legal history (supra, n.4), p.189-190 
34 It is the case that some Protestant German humanists treated the Germania as a repository of moral ideals 
which their nation and denomination should emulate (see C. B. Krebs, A most dangerous book: Tacitus’ 
Germania from the Roman Empire to the Third Reich, London 2011, p.125-128), but it must be remembered 
that Tacitus’ entire purpose in writing the Germania was to contrast, for rhetorical purposes, the virtues of 
Germanic barbarism with the seeming decadence and servility of Roman civilisation and that he did much 
the same thing with his account of Roman Britain, the Agricola. Hotman therefore inferred little that Tacitus 
did not explicitly state. He may have seen the text as having particular relevance to the contemporary 
religious and political reality, but that is a matter of reception, not distortion and, in any case, there is 
nothing explicit in Hotman’s text to suggest that this was the case. The success of the Germanist thesis can 
be explained by the simple fact that it was objectively more plausible than Connan’s Celtic origin story or 
the wishful thinking of those who wanted feudal tenure to become a relic of the Roman empire. Apart from 
anything else, if the belief that the origins of feudal law are to be found in the Germania is a specifically 
Protestant position that articulates hostility to Catholicism, we must wonder why so many Catholic feudal 
lawyers embraced the theory enthusiastically. As Douglas Osler has stated, the tendency to treat legal 
humanism as a predominantly Protestant phenomenon ignores the significant part played by southern 
European Catholic lawyers; see D Osler, Legal Humanism, Max-Planck Institute 
(http://www.rg.mpg.de/research/legal-humanism). 
35 Pocock, The ancient constitution (supra, n.30), p.88 
and slave.36 Within Craig’s sociological model, slavery had arisen in prehistory, along with 
warfare and the laws of nations, and was common to all human societies,37 but its 
implementation and the relative rights of slave and master varied from place to place, as did 
the attitudes of the enslaved. In this case, there existed a distinction between the forms of 
slavery practised by the Romans and what Craig perceived as the milder forms found among 
the ancient Germans. Roman slavery was characterised by the master’s unlimited power over 
his slaves, his right to use and abuse his human property as he saw fit and by the servility of 
the enslaved. Thus he states that “[a]mong the southern peoples, slavery was harsh and the 
authority of masters grievous; and the further south one went, the more scandalous was the 
condition of the slaves, for the master had absolute power of life and death, while the slaves 
had nothing that could be called their own and were beaten down and compelled to support 
their masters through their labour in workshops and mills, that is, in the vilest and most 
wretched employments of grinding and ploughing at their masters’ whim.”38 In the north, 
however, among the Germans, the institution of slavery was both less common and much less 
harsh and the people themselves were less tolerant of encroachments upon their personal 
liberty. So while the Roman slave lived in his master’s house and performed domestic 
functions, the German slave was more akin to a tenant and had his own house, land and 
family which he governed as though free. Instead of performing domestic duties for his 
master, the German slave provided a specific and fixed amount of grain, cattle or cloth and 
could not be compelled to surrender anything beyond that. Germanic slavery lacked most of 
the characteristics that a modern readership associate with the institution; while the slave was 
subordinate to his master in certain respects, he retained clear sets of rights against which his 
                                                 
36 JF 1.4.2 
37 JF 1.1.6 
38 JF 1.4.2: [A]pud populos meridionales dura erat servitus, dominorum imperia gravia; quoque magis ad 
meridiem declinabant, servorum conditio fuit iniquior; in quos libera erat dominis vitae et necis potestas; 
nihil illi quod suum, nihil quod proprium dici posset, habebant et ad ergasteria et pistrina, id est, ad 
vilissima et miserrima ministeria molendi et arandi pro dominorum arbitrio detrudebantur, dominos suis 
laboribus alere coacti.  
master could not transgress. Above all, one cannot usefully speak of German masters as 
owning their slaves, with the full property rights that such a term would imply. Craig tells us 
that this reflected what the ancients saw as the northerners’ “intolerance of servitude” by 
contrast with the more servile southern nations whom he describes (quoting the poet Lucan) 
as “weakened by the mildness of the climate” (emollit gentes clementia coeli).  
 
 The discussion of the supposed relationship between climate and national character 
had deep roots in Western thought. The earliest iteration of this idea is found in a text of 
Hippocrates, from the fifth century BC, named On Airs, Waters and Places though the idea 
was taken up by, amongst others, Plato.39 The most famous formulation of climate theory, 
however, was that of Aristotle in the seventh book of the Politics. Predictably, the Aristotelian 
articulation of climate theory was accepted as authoritative by a great many authors, both 
ancient and modern.40 Among the humanist writers, the Aristotelian theory of climate was a 
relatively common topic for discussion; so, for example, Buchanan’s De jure regni apud 
Scotos mentions both the seeming servility of Asiatic peoples and the superior intelligence of 
people from warm climates.41 Tacitus utilised this same basic theory of climate in the 
Germania to explain the moral differences that he perceived between Germans and Romans. 
As one classicist describes matters, it was as though “the degree of morality stood in inverse 
proportion to degrees Fahrenheit.”42 Although Tacitus was Craig’s primary source on climate, 
it is augmented in places by material from less famous Latin authors, such as Vitruvius and 
Vegetius.43 It is not necessarily the case that Craig had read these more obscure sources 
directly and it may be that he derived them from Bodin’s Methodus ad facilem historiarum 
                                                 
39 J.K. Ward, Ethnos in the Politics: Aristotle and race, in: Philosophers on race: critical essays, eds. J K. Ward 
and T.L. Lott, Oxford 2008, p.14-37, at 20 
40 For example, the Book 14 of Montesquieu’s L’esprit des lois is titled Des loix, dans la rapport qu’elles ont 
avec la nature du climat (“On laws and their relationship to the nature of climate”). 
41 G. Buchanan, De jure regni apud Scotos, p.8 on warmer climates and intelligence; p.145 on Asiatic servility 
(all references to the 1750 Glasgow edition). 
42 Krebs, A most dangerous book (supra, n.34), p.159 
43 Cf. Craig, Jus feudale (supra, n.18) p.89, n.6. 
cognitionem, which discusses the relationship between climate and character at length, both 
in general terms and with particular reference to the ancient Germans.44 Bodin was a 
favoured source for Craig’s work, one he both cited and recommended to his own readers.45 
Our interpretation of Craig’s feudal history should recognise the part played by contemporary 
humanist literature in framing both the conversation and its immediate reception. So while 
the Germania was the primary source, its interpretation and presentation were informed by a 
wider body of scholarly thought. This becomes clearer still as Craig moves on to analyse 
differences in the Roman and German treatment of slaves. 
 
 Where a Roman master had the legal power of life and death over his slaves – the 
infamous vitae necisque potestas – a German master did not. Craig is emphatic on that point. 
A German might kill his slave in the heat of the moment, because he was angry or had been 
provoked, but he had no implicit or explicit right to kill a slave. Such a distinction may be 
subtle, since the slave would be dead in either case, but it is nevertheless important. Craig 
was articulating the classical ideological position that Romans were reasonable, rational 
humans who had mastered their passions whereas barbarians were erratic and driven entirely 
by their emotional impulses.46 Hence there could be no equivalence of moral culpability 
between the civilised Roman who coolly chooses to kill a slave and the German barbarian 
who kills accidentally after lashing out in anger. This, too, is a topic discussed in Bodin’s 
Methodus where it is explained that Germans were, by nature, more like beasts than men: 
“He who is removed from humanitas (that is, from the nature of humans) is much the same as 
a beast, since beasts lack reason and are unable to restrain their temper and passion.”47 The 
                                                 
44 Bodin, Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem, Paris 1572, p.119-125. 
45 See Dodd, Craig’s aetiology (supra, n.7), p.149, 168, 171, etc., for instances of Craig utilising the Methodus. 
46 P.J. Heather, The barbarian in late antiquity: image, reality, and transformation, in: Constructing identities 
in late antiquity, ed. R. Miles, London 1999, p.234-258, at 236; and G. Woolf, Power and the spread of 
writing in the West, in Literacy and power in the ancient world, eds. A. Bowman and G. Woolf, Cambridge 
1994, p.84-98, at 84. 
47 Bodin, Methodus (supra, n.44), p.140: Quisque plus abest ab humanitate, id est, ab hominum natura, eo 
proprius ad ferarum similitudinem accedit, quae cum ratione careant, iracundiam et appetitus cohibere 
nequeunt. In this instance, note that humanitas can be translated as ‘civilisation’ or ‘humanity’ and was the 
corollary of this is that when Germans killed, they did so not from cruelty but from anger 
and, as a source for this, Bodin quotes the very same section of Tacitus as Craig;48 a few 
pages later, Bodin repeats the point but adds that northern peoples, though temperamental, 
were quickly and easily placated while southern peoples generally acted coldly and with 
vulpine cunning (vulpina callidate).49  
 
 Slavery among the Germans was sufficiently mild that individuals would stake their 
liberty during dice games. Craig relates this form of debt slavery to a similar practice among 
the early mediaeval Lombards, described using noun guadium or vadium (‘pledge’), whereby 
anyone who could not repay a debt became the king’s slave.50 Following this, he cites Bodin 
as saying that those enslaved in this way, or their families, could buy freedom by settling the 
outstanding debt.51 The starkest difference between Roman and Germanic slavery – and 
certainly the difference which was of most importance to a feudist – was to be found in the 
military sphere, for while Romans forbade their slaves from military service on pain of death, 
German masters routinely armed their slaves and took them to war. In addition to slave-
soldiers, Craig quotes Tacitus as saying that Germanic chieftains recruited and maintained 
comitatus or retinues of fighting men who would live alongside their chief, eating at his table 
and receiving all their necessities for him; in return, they acted as a bodyguard: “To guard 
[the chieftain], to protect him, to dedicate their own brave deeds to his glory: this is their 
special vow.”  He finishes this section (JF 1.4.3) by stating explicitly, “[T]he northern nations 
treated their slaves as though they were retainers or at least tenants, imposing on the weaker 
ones a customary annual payment whether of money or grain or cloth, which the masters, in 
                                                 
standard term to describe the literary product and culture of ancient Rome. 
48 Ibid.: Occidere solent, inquit [Tacitus], non disciplina et severitate sed impetu ac ira ut inimicum. 
49 Ibid., p.145. 
50 Craig’s likely source on this is Hotman, Dictionarium verborum feudalium (=p.742 in 1574 Cologne 
edition). 
51 Probably referring to Bodin, Methodus (supra, n.44), p.141, which quotes the same section of Tacitus that 
Craig uses. 
turn, passed to the stronger servants as though in place of a wage. Nothing happened either at 
home or on campaign without them: at home they attended the assembly, and on campaign 
they contributed their efforts and their strength.” Slaves are thus split into two groups with 
different duties and rewards. The weaker slaves were indistinguishable from tenant farmers; 
they worked the land and paid a fixed and limited amount of what they produced to their 
master, but the rest was their own and they ruled their own homes independent of their 
master’s will. The stronger slaves fought and in return received grants of food, money and 
clothing. Chieftains also maintained groups of free retainers bound to them by vows of 
martial loyalty. From this material, it is easy to see the direction that Craig’s mind was taking. 
In Tacitus’ description of ancient German society, he saw a reflection of mediaeval feudal 
practice. 
 
 Given the centrality of the Germania to Craig’s argumentation, some explanation is 
needed of its position within humanist thought on law and history. Long before Craig started 
work on the Jus feudale, the humanists had found Tacitus to be an invaluable source. The 
father of the legal humanist methodology, Andrea Alciato, published an edition of Tacitus in 
1517 in which he praised the author as the best Roman historian and superior by far to Livy.52 
Alciato’s focus was entirely on the civil law, so Tacitus’ work was valuable to him because it 
illuminated the historical context in which the Roman law had functioned. Alciato’s students 
and successors applied the humanist methodology to the study of French municipal and 
feudal law,53 but they also found a politically topical use for Tacitus, employing the 
                                                 
52  J.H.M. Salmon, Cicero and Tacitus in sixteenth-century France, American Historical Review, 85 (1990), 
p.307-331, at 310; N.G. Siraisi, History, medicine, and the traditions of renaissance learning, Ann Arbor 
2007, p.158. A contrary view existed, so the humanist Budé derided Tacitus as the worst of all historians, 
largely because he was a pagan who had criticised Christianity. Bodin discusses the matter in the Methodus 
(supra, n.44), p.95-96. 
53 C.P. Rodgers, Humanism, history and the common law, Journal of Legal History 6 (1985) p.129–56, at 131; 
see also Kelley, The rise of legal history (supra, n.4), p.187 and 192-3; Pocock, The ancient constitution 
(supra, n.30), p.13–14; and M. Stuckey, Early modern English humanism and antiquarianism: the 
prosopographical method and reflections on historico-legal tradition, Journal of Legal History, 33 (2012), 
p.31-64, at 59. See J.L. Brown, The Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem of Jean Bodin: a critical 
study, Washington 1939, p.29-45 for the ways in which Bodin’s dissatisfaction with the humanist emphasis 
Germania to advance a new set of historical theories about the origins of their country and its 
institutions. France’s mediaeval foundation myth was to be found in the seventh-century 
Fredegarii scholastici chronicum or Chronicle of Fredegar which assigned the origin of the 
Carolingian dynasty and, therefore, of the Franks to a Trojan prince named Francus (a 
synonym of Astyanax, the son of the Trojan hero Hector). Other mediaeval texts repeated 
versions of this story – for example, the Liber historiae Francorum, the Historia Britonnum 
of Nennius and, during the later middle ages, the Grandes chroniques de France. French 
legal humanists rejected these fantastic and implausible romances and sought an alternative 
and historically credible explanation of Frankish and therefore French origins.54 They found 
it in what Kelley has described as the “Germanist paradigm” which drew upon classical 
writers like Tacitus and the more obscure “barbarian historians” of late antiquity, such as 
Jordanes, to reconstruct the Franks as a Germanic tribe who had crossed the Rhine and settled 
in Gaul in the early middle ages.55 This excavation of the authentic beginnings and history of 
the Franks served specific political ends, particularly as it related to royal power and religious 
liberty;56 importantly, the humanist reconstruction of French history extended to France’s 
entire national identity and all the things related thereto, which, of necessity, meant the extant 
system of feudal tenure and the law by which it was governed. For Craig’s purposes, this is 
the single most important aspect of the humanist investigation of Frankish history: it 
introduced him to the idea that feudal tenure originated in ancient Germany. 
 
 The Germania, as we have said, was a primary source not only for Craig but also for 
                                                 
on Rome drove him to develop his own approach to the study of law and history. 
54 For example, Hotman in the Francogallia dismisses the Trojan origin story as poetry, not history (p.34 of the 
1586 Frankfurt edition). It is interesting to note that the English historian William Temple, writing in the 
seventeenth century, designated one Pharamond as the founder of the Frankish nation (C. Kidd, British 
identities before nationalism: ethnicity and nationhood in the Atlantic world, 1600-1800, Cambridge 2005, 
p.244-5); while Pharamond was no less legendary (or no more historical) than Francus, his existence was 
attested by Gregory of Tours whose work was seen as more historically authentic. This search for 
plausibility defines the work of humanist historians. 
55 D.R. Kelley, Faces of history: historical inquiry from Herodotus to Herder, London 1998, p.179-180; cf. 
Krebs, A most dangerous book (supra, n.34), p.158-159  
56 I. Wood, The modern origins of the early middle ages, Oxford 2013, p.11-12 
many other historians of the feudal law. It was a text that had been written with a particular 
agenda which Craig fully internalised. Tacitus, above all else, was a moral writer and his 
work was intended to critique what he saw as the shortcomings of contemporary Romans by 
contrasting their decadence with the supposed virtues of the Germans (primarily sexual 
constancy, personal loyalty, fortitude, physical courage and a devotion to liberty).57 This was, 
in effect, the earliest iteration of the literary trope of the Noble Savage and that was the lens 
through which Craig viewed ancient German society. Nor was he alone in doing so. A great 
many sixteenth century writers embraced the contrast between the innate honour and decency 
of Noble Savages and the cruelty and brutality of contemporary Christians, particularly 
within the context of the French wars of religion.58 Craig read the Germania within a Scottish 
feudal context and therefore invested it with relevance specific to those circumstances and to 
the compositional function of the Jus feudale. He asserts that what Tacitus said of the 
Germans was in fact true of “all the northern nations”, which of course includes the Scots,59 
and quotes the Roman emperor Julian as saying, “You see how the Syrians freely serve other 
nations and, by contrast, how great is the love of liberty among the Celtic peoples.”60 This 
same remark is quoted, in nearly identical words, by Bodin and Cujas, both of whom Craig 
had read,61 but, as a Scot, Craig imbued the comment with a meaning it might not have had to 
                                                 
57 Cf. Salmon, Cicero and Tacitus (supra, n.52), p.309 
58 Montaigne, who is often erroneously thought of as the inventor of the trope, is the best-known example, but 
there are a great many others. On Montaigne’s use of this literary device, see T. Cave, How to read 
Montaigne, London 2007, p.81-82; D. Quint, Montaigne and the quality of mercy: ethical and political 
themes in the Essais, Princeton 1998, p.92-99; and A. Levine, Sensual philosophy: toleration, skepticism, 
and Montaigne's politics of the self, Lanham 2001, p.105-107. 
59 Tacitus was the first ancient author to make a distinction between Celts and Germans. Certain writers of the 
seventeenth century attempted to fold the two groups back into one another. Thus, the German humanist 
Philipp Clüver (1580-1622) said in his Germania antiqua that the Germans were a branch of the Celtic 
family (= p.41 in the 1616 Leiden edition) while the English historian William Temple discerned similarities 
between the ancient customs of the Germans and those of contemporary Scots and Irish, whom he held to be 
of “northern Scythian” and hence Germanic stock (Kidd, British Identities (supra, n.54), p.196). As late as 
the 19th century, the English-born German nationalist and völkisch writer H.S. Chamberlain envisioned 
Tacitus’ Germans as encompassing Celts and Slavs as well as the modern German nation (Krebs, A most 
dangerous book (supra, n.34), p.209-210). 
60 JF 1.4.3, Sic Julianus apud Cyrillum, Vides, inquit, quam libenter Syri aliis nationibus inserviant, contra 
vero quantus libertatis amor in Celtarum populis. 
61 Bodin, De republica, p.42 (1586 Paris edition); Cujas, De origine et natura feudorum dissertatio (vol. 2, 
p.1045 of the 1758 Venice Opera).  
writers of other nations. Similarly, he wholeheartedly embraced the idea the colder northern 
climate bred a tougher, more robust and decidedly warlike people.62 Craig quotes a portion of 
Lucan’s Pharsalia which describes the northern peoples as “untameable in war” (indomitus 
bellis) and focused entirely on martial virtues (apud eos omnia in virtute militari posita). It is 
likely that these descriptions reminded him of the people of his own country;63 or, more 
exactly, it reminded him of the way that the Scots wished to see themselves and to be seen by 
others, as a freedom-loving, martial and headstrong people whose social morality echoed that 
of the ancient Germans whom Tacitus so respected.64 The perception of the Scots as existing 
at some distance from mainstream European civilisation had been commented on by George 
Buchanan, who rather meekly observed that while those in the north had no great reputation 
for intellect, being at such a remove from “literature, culture and all cultivation of the 
mind”,65 no nation had been completely deprived of intelligence and, in any case, Scottish 
shortcomings in matters of the mind were explained by the fact that foreigners were less 
emotional and therefore less prone to be distracted from intellectual discussion. With the 
Germania, Craig was able to construe the perception of Scotland as a place outside the 
bounds of normal European civilisation in a positive way, as a marker that their supposed 
removal from civilised norms actually amounted to a removal from the sphere of decadence, 
servility and general immorality. In multiple ways, therefore, Craig, the early modern feudal 
lawyer, was trying to connect the ancient past to his contemporary Scottish experience. 
 
                                                 
62 This theory is discussed at excessive length by Bodin in the fifth chapter of the De republica and in the 
Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem (supra, n.44): p.119-125 on the link between climate and 
physical character and p.133 on the German love of war. For later use of the trope, see Krebs, A most 
dangerous book (supra, n.34), p.171-172. 
63 Cf. JF 1.11.3 where he compares the armour of the ancient Greeks to that of contemporary Highlanders. 
64 Tacitus’ other minor work is the Agricola, which deals with the Roman conquest of Britain and represents 
the earliest literary portrait of the Celtic inhabitants of what would later become Scotland. Craig was familiar 
with the text and drew upon it in writing both his dedicatory epistle to the Jus feudale (see Epistola 
nuncupatoria auctoris, in Craig, Jus feudale (supra, n.18), p.lviii-lxxix, at lxx [Latin] and lxxi [English]) 
and his text on the British union, the De unione regnorum Britanniae. He does not utilise the Agricola here 
because it had no direct relevance to a discussion of the origins of feudal law and tenure, but the text 
certainly influenced his thinking. 
65 A literis, humanitate, omnique ingenii cultu homines..., Buchanan, De jure regni (supra, n.41), 8. 
The infancy of the feudal law 
 
 If the ancestor of vassalage was the Germanic comitatus whereby retainers fought for 
their chiefs and in return were provided with everything they needed to live, the question 
remains of how this social structure was transplanted from first century Germany to 
mediaeval Europe where it evolved from the relatively primitive system of military clientship 
described by Tacitus into an articulated form of land tenure and law. The journey from tribal 
to feudal society began, for Craig, with the barbarian invasions of the Roman empire in the 
fifth and sixth centuries. He explains that Goths, Vandals, Huns, Lombards and other 
barbarian groups divided up the provinces of the empire between them and in the process 
displaced existing Roman practice.66 For greater context, it should be noted that Bodin also 
dealt with the barbarian invasions of the Roman empire and covered the same material as 
Craig. Bodin, however, approached the aftermath of the barbarian invasions from the 
perspective of the relative intellectual and cultural capacity of the invaders and the peoples 
they subjugated, explaining that the barbarians were more effective as soldiers than as 
rulers;67 though eminently capable of conquest, they lacked the ability to rule effectively and 
were compelled to appoint civilised men as ministers.68 While we can be reasonably certain 
that Craig had read and understood these parts of the Methodus, his interest was less diffuse 
than Bodin’s and focused only on the transition to a feudal society. 
 
 Consequently, Craig’s account is quite straightforward. Having divided up the Roman 
provinces amongst themselves, the barbarian leaders would dole out land to their weaker 
servants in return for rents of oil, grain, cattle, cloth and money. The chieftain’s strongest 
followers became his personal companions or retainers and were paid in kind for their 
                                                 
66 JF 1.4.4 
67 Bodin, Methodus (supra, n.44), p.140 
68 Ibid., p.138 
service, since monetary wages had not yet developed. To that extent, Craig’s description of 
early mediaeval German society west of the Rhine is identical in its main particulars to 
Tacitus’ description of ancient German society east of the Rhine. The difference, and the 
genesis of feudal tenure, came later when, in place of the fruits of the chieftain’s lands, the 
retainers were given the actual estates from which their payments were drawn. As Craig puts 
it, “There seemed to be no difference to the lords whether they conferred the land itself or all 
the fruits and profits derived from the land, as it would nevertheless always be in their power, 
should they wish, to take away either the estate or the payment that had been given in feu.”69 
It is the grant that is here described a feu, not the land itself, and these tenants had no more 
than a precarium jus or precarious right over the land they occupied;70 it could be revoked by 
the true owner, the retainer’s lord, as and when he wished. The tenants are described by Craig 
as servants (servientes) and are distinguished from slaves (servi); he helpfully explains that 
where slaves are subject to servitus (slavery), the servant is bound merely to servitium 
(service).71 Where the slave was wholly owned by his master, the servant was bound only “to 
provide faithful labour and sometimes to proffer help and advice.” To an extent, we can see 
that Craig is anticipating Marx in describing the transition from the ancient slave economy to 
the early mediaeval feudal economy and it is, in fact, of central importance to Craig’s 
argumentation that there exists a meaningful and material difference between the ancient and 
mediaeval worlds, between pre-feudal and feudal tenure. Accordingly, he seeks to 
differentiate between Roman slaves and Germanic servants (or serfs) and between the forms 
of labour they owed and the levels of power that their masters had over them.72 It is likely 
that in writing this section Craig was drawing upon Hotman’s dictionary, which provides 
                                                 
69 [N]ihil dominorum interesse videretur, utrum res ipsas an fructus omnes ac utilitates rei assignarent; sic 
tamen ut in dominorum semper esset potestate aut ipsum praedium aut pensionem in feudum datam quando 
vellent auferre. 
70 On the precarium, cf. F.L. Ganshof, Qu’est-ce que la féodalité?, Neuchâtel 1947, p.27. 
71 Craig’s definitions are correct only in mediaeval Latin; in classical Latin, both servitus and servitium mean 
‘slavery’. 
72 Thus, Gretton, Feudal system (supra, n.23), para. 43, notes that while the earliest form of vassalage “was in 
some ways like slavery...nonetheless there was a clear distinction between the vassal and the slave. The 
vassal was a free man.” 
specifically feudal definitions of both servire and servitium.73  
 
 It came to be seen as unfair that tenants could be dispossessed at their lord’s whim, so 
a fixed form of tenure was introduced, initially for one year.74 This was the next step in the 
development of the feudal law and the evolution of feudal tenure. Craig describes the lands 
given in this way as “annual feus” (feuda annalia) and this is important because it is here, for 
the first time, that the word feudum is used to describe land held or leased from another. He 
explains that, “[a]s time went by, the merits, or the insolence, of servants arranged it so that 
feus began to be given for life; that is, they were granted by the lord to the client for the 
duration of his lifetime, with contracts introduced between lord and servant regarding their 
mutual obligations. These feus could truly be called usufruct. They also constitute the 
original cradle of feudal law.”75 Lifelong tenure, Craig explains, was akin to the Turkish 
timar, the system of land tenure whereby a benefice was granted by the Ottoman state to a 
horseman (or sipahi) in return for military service. It is striking that Craig should try to 
explain early feudal practice by analogy to then-contemporary Turkish practice.76 The timar, 
which Craig describes with surprising accuracy,77 did bear some resemblance to European 
feudal practice – although, and certainly from a Marxist perspective, it could be argued that 
the timar was not a feudal institution at all and actually represented a state effort to avoid the 
                                                 
73 Hotman, Dictionarium verborum feudalium, s.v. servire and servitium : [Servitium est] [m]unus obsequii 
clientelaris. Similiter potest feudum dari ad certum servitium... Proprie servitium est officium servile... 
Itaque, feudale officium vel obsequium libentius appellavimus. Nam saepe servitii nomine officium 
affectionis significationis significatur, ut illud quod imperii vasalli imperatori suo debent. (“[Service is] the 
duty of an obedient client. A feu can be given in return for fixed service... Properly, service is servile duty... 
We therefore describe it as feudal duty or as the obedience of a loyal man. For often the name of service 
signifies the duty of affection which the vassals of an empire owe to their emperor.”) [=p.737-8 in the 1574 
Cologne edition]. 
74 JF 1.4.5 
75 Ac successu temporis sive id servientium merita sive importunitas procurasset, feuda coeperunt esse vitalia, 
id est, a domino clienti concedebantur pro tempore vitae, pactionibus interpositis inter dominum et 
servientem de mutua tutela; et tum vere omnia feuda usus fructus dici poterant. Et haec sunt juris feudalis 
prima cunabula. 
76 Strictly speaking, the timar was close to death by the time Craig wrote the Jus feudale. It had buckled 
beneath the strain of constant wars of expansion and, with the widespread use of gunpowder, Turkish 
sipahis, like Western knights, had lapsed into obsolescence. 
77 Craig’s source on the timariot was Bodin’s De republica (supra, n.61) p.190ff. 
dangers of a feudalised economy78 – so the comparison would seem apposite enough for a 
feudal jurist; yet it is unlikely that Craig’s intended readership of Scottish lawyers would 
have been any more familiar with the structure of the timar than are their descendants in the 
twenty-first century. The fact that Craig has to go into some depth about the workings of the 
timar, which includes explaining that it is etymologically derived from the Greek word τιμή 
(‘honour’ or ‘honorarium’),79 suggests that he anticipated his readers’ lack of familiarity. 
Indeed, when the English feudist Henry Spelman wrote about this same topic, he dispensed 
entirely with any reference to Turkish practice,80 presumably because it was too obscure a 
topic to have much illustrative value for a British audience. Not only was the Turkish 
digression potentially confusing, it also had the effect of muddying the early mediaeval 
waters with anachronism. Pocock notes the most salient fault with Craig’s Turkish analogy: 
“He seems to think of the Germanic invaders, as of the Turks, as settling their conquered 
provinces with a strong centralised military class, instantly obedient to the prince’s call.”81 
One wonders why Craig brought it up at all. He was obviously relying heavily upon Bodin’s 
De republica, which uses the timar as an illustration of lifelong feus and the mutual bonds of 
affection between vassal and lord,82 to demonstrate the nature of feus, stating that “what we 
                                                 
78 C. Wickham, The uniqueness of the east, in: Feudalism and non-European societies, eds. T.J. Byres and H. 
Mukhia, Bristol 1985, p.166-196, at 180; and F. Öztürk, Ottoman and Turkish law, Bloomington 2014, p.76-
77. A contrary view, common to Marxists and historical materialists is that the “feudal mode of production” 
describes any economic system where a productive class is dominated by an elite who absorb surplus 
production through either rent or tax. Unfortunately, much scholarship of this sort has the clear agenda of 
advancing Marx’s theory that the ancient slave economy evolved into the mediaeval feudal economy. In 
consequence, terms like “feudal” have been redefined repeatedly and twisted away from their original 
meanings. In Craig’s day, the adjective “feudal” was a juristic term and tenure was feudal only if it is 
governed by principles of the feudal law. For Craig, the holding of land from the Ottoman state would have 
been equivalent to holding land directly from the Ottoman monarch and, since tenure was dependent upon 
the timariot providing military service to a superior, it was in accord with feudal legal principles and would 
ipso facto have been feudal in nature. 
79 On the various meanings of the word timar, see Z. Haque, Origin and development of the Ottoman timar 
system, Islamic Studies, 15 (1976) p.123-134, at 123. 
80 Pocock, The ancient constitution (supra, n.30), p.97; by contrast, James Harrington, in his Oceana (1656), 
compared Turkish timariots to Roman beneficiarii but he did so as part of a much larger historical project 
than Craig’s, one which saw the Ottoman and Roman Empires as analogous manifestations of monarchic 
absolutism (ibid., p.132-134 and 143). 
81 Ibid., p.82 
82 Bodin has been misunderstood by some Marxist scholars who seek to make him much more conscious of the 
differences between Western feudal practice and the timar than he actually was; for example, see M. Sawer, 
Marxism and the question of the Asiatic mode of production, The Hague 1977, p.9. 
call a feu, [the Turks] call a timar; and what we call a beneficiary or vassal, they call a 
timariot.”83 So, if nothing else, this Ottoman digression locates Craig’s thought squarely 
within the web of humanist, and particularly French legal humanist, literature, which may 
have been the point. 
 
 This early period, during which a feu was of lifelong duration and could therefore not 
be passed to heirs, is described by Craig as the “infancy of feus” and he tells us that it extends 
down to around the year 650. The barbarian invaders of the Roman empire, specifically the 
Franks in Gaul, the Goths in Spain and the Lombards in Italy, “had consolidated the homes 
they had acquired by the sword and were holding them in leisure and in peace, without any 
trouble.”84 It was at this point that Craig discerned the earliest appearance of feudal legal 
terminology such as feudum (‘feu’), vassallus (‘vassal’) and homagium (‘homage’). The first 
appearance of feudal legal terminology does not necessarily constitute the first appearance of 
the feudal law, but it suggested the existence of forms of land tenure that were fundamentally 
different from those of the pre-feudal Roman world. While these words were hugely 
important for Craig’s argumentation, here and elsewhere,85 he makes no attempt to define 
them at this point, because he is interested not in the exact meaning of any particular piece of 
feudal terminology but in the fact that they are being used at all. However, by describing the 
land held of another person as a feudum, he is implicitly defining that word; he is assuming 
that a piece of land and a feu are interchangeable and this is one of the main reasons for 
Susan Reynolds’ sharp criticism of him.86 For Craig’s historical purposes (which are, it need 
                                                 
83 Bodin, De republica (supra, n.61), p.107, quod nos feudum, ipsi Timar appellant et beneficiaros seu 
vassallos Timariotas. This is also Craig’s source on the supposed Greek etymology. The timar is discussed 
further on p.190-191, which mentions what Bodin calls the zamoglomos (the devşirme or paidomazoma 
“blood tax” whereby the children of Christian families were taken as tribute by Ottoman officials) and 
briefly on p.577. He also mention the timar in passing in the Methodus (supra, n.44), p.413-414). 
84 [A]rmis partas sibi sedes stabilierant et sine molestia in otio et pace possidebant. 
85 Craig was extremely sensitive to the anachronistic use or misuse of language. Thus, when English historians 
claimed that the early Scottish kings had been vassals of England and had done homage, Craig dismisses the 
argument on the basis that feudal concepts like homage did not exist in the British Isles at that time (see L. 
Dodd, Historical introduction in: Jus feudale tribus libris comprehensum (supra, n.18), p.xiii-lxvi, at xxiii).  
86 S. Reynolds, Fiefs and vassals in Scotland: a view from outside, Scottish Historical Review 82 (2003) p.176-
hardly be said, quite different from those of modern scholars), the purpose of this entire 
discussion was no more than to establish the earliest point at which feudal language appears 
and therefore to establish the earliest origin of something that might reasonably be called 
feudal tenure. Moreover, the process which Craig is describing is a direct consequence of the 
end of the Roman empire; in a very typically humanistic way, the new feudal society of the 
middle ages becomes essentially a replacement for the more complex society of ancient 
Rome. So too the feudal law, even at this embryonic phase, becomes a customary 
replacement for the displaced Roman civil law. 
 
 While no form of hereditary succession to a feu exists at this point in the narrative, 
Craig nevertheless sees some foreshadowing of hereditary succession within the general 
culture and milieu of this “infancy of feus”. He states that the holders of these feus were 
called nativi, the Latin ancestor of the English ‘native’, a word which describes a quality or 
right that has been imparted by birth. Further, Craig maintains that nativus is a Latin cognate 
to the Scots law term ‘kindly tenant’ (a rather superannuated term describing a serf or 
bondsman) and, again, in this context the Scots adjective ‘kindly’ describes something 
imparted by birth.87 He finishes this section by stating that, despite the absence of any form 
of hereditary succession, “unless a just basis for offence was given or [the tenants] were not 
fit to serve, it was a harsh thing to remove them from their holdings”.88 If we take all of this 
                                                 
193, at 177. Recent work has pointed out some of the shortcomings in Reynolds’ approach (see Heirbaut, 
Feudal law (supra, n.19) passim). Certainly as it pertains to Craig, Reynolds has failed to grasp the 
specifically legal context in which the Jus feudale was produced and the practical function it was intended to 
serve treating it instead as a theoretical and academic work. This has had a deleterious effect on her 
interpretation of the text. The present author hopes, in the near future, to explore in detail the problematic 
treatment Craig has received at the hands of both Susan Reynolds and of Elizabeth Brown who has been 
similarly scathing in her criticism of Craig and has sought to place on his shoulders responsibility for 
creating the construct of feudalism (see E.A.R. Brown, The tyranny of a construct: feudalism and historians 
of medieval Europe, American Historical Review 79 (1974), p.1063-1088, at 1064). 
87 See Dictionary of the Scots Language, s.v. kindly. 
88 [N]isi justa offensae causa praecesserit et ad serviendum non sufficerent, durum erat a suis possessionibus 
removere. Craig’s interpretation, here as elsewhere, follows similar lines to that of Ganshof who likewise 
observed that the earliest feudal tenements, though nominally granted for life, were in practice heritable 
(“des tenures à vie presque toujours et même le plus souvent héréditaires en fait”); see Qu’est-ce que la 
féodalité? (supra, n.70) p.25. 
together, we can see that there is an implication that hereditary or generational succession to 
a lifelong feu already existed, not as a legal right but as a privilege or kindness extended by 
the superior to the vassal’s heirs. In his assertion that it was harsh to remove someone from a 
feu without good reason, we can even see the seeds of feudal morality – the culture of 
fairness and propriety which, in Craig’s mind, defined the relationship between superior and 
vassal and which were “the training ground for all manners and duties and the only defence 
against the unjust ambitions”.89 
 
 The period between 650 and the reign of Charlemagne is described by Craig as the 
childhood, or pueritia, of feus and it is then that feus undergo the transition from lifelong 
tenure to partial heritability whereby the sons of the feudal grantee could inherit their father’s 
feu as a matter of right. “Thus a feu, which had heretofore been no more than a usufruct, was 
extended to the sons or to the one of them whom the lord considered most suitable for his 
service.”90 It seems significant that Craig would make this point, that the earliest iterations of 
feudal tenure were, in practical terms, indistinguishable from usufruct.91 During the middle 
ages, feudal lawyers had wrestled with the question of how and if ownership of the feu was 
divided between superior and vassal; Pilius, a jurist from the law school of Bologna whose 
floruit was in the late twelfth century, developed the idea of a divided ownership in which the 
vassal received dominium utile and the superior retained dominium directum;92 when 
Accursius wrote his Gloss, he incorporated this idea and, as a consequence, was often 
thought of as its originator.93 In the sixteenth century, a group of legal humanists emerged to 
whom the idea of divided dominium was repugnant because it was not found in the civil law 
                                                 
89 Epistola nuncupatoria, in Craig, Jus feudale (supra, n.18), p.lxxiv (Latin) and lxxv (English). 
90 Itaque feudum quod prius tantummodo usus fructus erat, etiam ad filios continuabatur, aut ad eorum 
aliquem quem dominus servitio suo aptissimum designabat.  
91 Cf. Pocock, The ancient constitution (supra, n.30), p.81 
92 See R. Feenstra, Les origines du dominium utile chez les glossateurs, in: Fata iuris Romani, ed. R. Feenstra, 
Leiden 1974, p.215-259, passim. 
93 Gretton, Feudal system (supra, n.23), para. 49, n.2; see also T. Rüfner, The Roman concept of ownership and 
the medieval doctrine of dominium utile, in: Creation of the ius commune: From casus to regula, eds. J.W. 
Cairns and P.J. du Plessis, Edinburgh 2010, p.127-142, at 130-131. 
and they advanced instead the idea that a feu was no more than a usufruct. In the ninth title of 
Book 1 of the Jus feudale, Craig explains that “Cujas, Schöner and the modern 
commentators” maintained that “the word [feudum] refers...only to the usufruct of the 
property” with undivided dominium remaining with the superior;94 therefore a feu could not 
grant ownership of any kind to a vassal, but merely a right of use over property owned by 
someone else. These scholars were advancing a Romanising interpretation which treated 
feudal tenure as either a derivation of or as functionally identical to Roman practice and 
which saw deviation from Roman legal norms as something abhorrent; at least for some of 
them, part of their motivation was the humanist impulse to treat the mediaeval as intrinsically 
inferior to the ancient. But, in any case, what the mediaeval glossators had called dominium 
utile was, in the eyes of Cujas and his colleagues, merely a burden on the superior’s right of 
ownership. Craig tells us that, “Of the modern writers whom I have read, only Hotman 
supports the division of ownership into directum and utile”;95 while this is true, the argument 
of Cujas and his fellows never posed a serious practical challenge to the prevailing theory of 
duplex dominium. Craig followed Hotman in coming down firmly in support of the 
traditional view that a feu conferred one form of ownership on the grantee while the granter 
retained another form of ownership and that, therefore, usufruct played no part in feudal law 
or tenure. It is possible to look at later Scots practice of duplex dominium and assume that it 
became the law of Scotland because Craig, and later Stair, sanctified it;96 thus Baird Smith 
remarked that “[t]he adoption...of Hotman's two dominia was a decision of capital 
importance in Scottish legal  theory”.97 It is, however, more likely that Craig’s endorsement 
of the mediaeval construct of duplex dominium was the articulation of then-current practice 
in Scotland. It is unlikely that the theory of feudal usufruct had ever been widely accepted by 
                                                 
94 JF 1.9.4 
95 JF 1.9.11: Solus ex recentioribus quos legi, Hottomannus hanc distinctionem dominii in directum et utile 
probat. 
96 Gretton, Feudal system (supra, n.23), para. 51; cf. MacQueen, Common law (supra, n.17), p.22. 
97 Baird Smith, François Hotman (supra, n.32), p.351 
Scots lawyers and still less likely that it found its way into the courts. Craig, despite his 
humanist impulses and appreciation for classical Roman culture, rejected the simplistic idea 
that the ancient had always to be preferred to the mediaeval and in this he reveals something 
about the complexity of his legal worldview. 
 
 Craig addressed the usufruct debate directly and substantively in his ninth title,98 but, 
for present purposes, it will be sufficient if we merely acknowledge that he rejected the 
notion that a feu was a usufruct. Yet that requires us to explain his meaning when he said that 
the earliest feus imparted only usufruct. Since he cannot have meant that a feu was literally 
ususfructus, in the Roman legal sense, nor that the feu in any way derived from the Roman 
law, he must have meant that a feu in the ‘childhood of feus’ was functionally or practically 
identical to the usufruct. Indeed, when he discusses the topic in his ninth title, he explains 
that feus and usufructs share certain similarities,99 but are nevertheless distinct legal 
phenomena.100 By the same token, when Prof. Gretton described the earliest manifestation of 
a feu as “in origin a species of usufruct”,101 he was not implying that the feu was a form, 
evolution or development of the classical Roman ususfructus; he meant simply that Roman 
usufruct and early feus both imparted a right to use land which belonged to another party who 
retained ownership. In part, Craig’s insistence that a feu was not truly a usufruct derived from 
his understanding of the differences between feudal and civil law and attendant refusal “to 
accept the application of of legal categories derived from Roman law to feudal 
conceptions”.102 While Craig was conscious that the feudal law had come to form a kind of 
                                                 
98 J.W. Cairns, Craig, Cujas and the definition of feudum: Is a feu a usufruct? in: Law, lawyers and humanism, 
ed. J.W. Cairns, Oxford 2015, p.401-412, has a full treatment of Craig’s argumentation on the topic. 
99 JF 1.9.10, [P]raeterea in multis feudum cum usufructu convenire et ejusdem esse naturae pene cum feudo, 
cum neque deteriorem feudi conditionem feudatarius facere possit, neque usufructuarius proprietatis. (“[I]n 
many respects a feu accords with a usufruct, which is practically of the same nature as a feu, because just as 
a feudatory cannot worsen the state of his feu, neither can a usufructuary worsen the state of his property.”) 
100 So, for example, if a feu were truly a usufruct, then neither curiality nor subinfeudation would be possible 
as it would create two usufructs over the same feu; see JF 1.9.11. 
101 Gretton, Feudal system (supra, n.23), para. 43 
102 J.C. Gardner, French and Dutch influences, in: An introductory survey of the sources and literature of Scots 
law [=Stair Society, vol. 1], Edinburgh 1936, p.226-234, at 231 
literary and theoretical appendix to mediaeval reception of the civil law,103 he nevertheless 
distinguished between them.  
 
 In the next section of the fourth title, Craig continues the story of feudal tenure’s 
evolution telling us that during the ‘childhood of feus’ the vassal’s lifelong rights were 
extended so that sons could inherit their father’s feu.104 The nature of succession varied from 
place to place – in some places, it was per capita, in others by nomination or, in places such 
as Britain, by primogeniture. Inheritance was limited to one generation because “[i]n those 
days, where a feu had been given to a man and his sons, grandsons were excluded from 
succession”.105 Craig feels that this oddity merits explanation because, as he says, “in law 
grandsons are very often encompassed by the term ‘sons’.”106 The reason for this seeming 
discrepancy is that feudal grants were held to be stricti juris as they are, by nature, 
privileges.107 Accordingly, if a granter provides only for the grantee and his sons, then it 
cannot legitimately be extended to grandsons; had the granter wished to provide for the 
grantee’s grandsons, then “he could have expressed it in the grant of the feu.”108 This is 
Craig’s first articulation of a supremely important principle of feudal law: namely, that the 
intent of the granter must always be taken into account when dealing with the fate of a feu. 
This, he explains, is quite different from the common law of feus, where a disposition in 
favour of a man and his sons extends to grandsons without limit, but it is analogous to the 
situation in the civil law where a privilege granted to a man and his sons is limited strictly to 
that man and his sons and no-one else. This was, Craig goes on to say, a highly topical point 
                                                 
103 Cf. JF 1.2.15 where the feudal law is described as “practically part of the civil law”. See also Heirbaut, 
Feudal law (supra, n.19) p.537-538. 
104 JF 1.4.7 
105 Nepotes autem in feudo alicui et ejus filiis concesso eis temporibus a successione arcebantur. 
106 [I]n jure filiorum nomine nepotes saepissime contineantur. The print editions of Jus feudale all cite Digest 
50.16.201 as a source for this assertion. 
107 Bartolus makes the same point: [F]eudum esse contractum consuetudinarium et stricti juris et esse stricte 
interpretandum. (“A feu is a customary contract stricti juris and must be interpreted strictly.”) Commentaria 
in primam digesti veteris partem (Basel, 1589), p.276 
108 [Q]uibus si voluisset provisum id in feudi concessione expressisset 
since there were those who, as a means of thwarting the Stuart succession to the English 
throne, sought to deny that a privilege granted to the king’s son also extended to his 
grandson. He finishes this section by reiterating that the childhood of feus lasted from the 
year 650 until the accession of Charlemagne (which Craig dates to 800) and by defining a 
feudum within this period as “merely a usufruct which had been granted to some servant or 
vassal and his first heir or heirs of the first degree.”109 The true (fully heritable) feu only 
emerged with the “adolescence of feudalism”, or adolescentia feudi, which Craig assigns to 
the time of the Emperor Conrad’s expedition to Rome.110 
 
The adolescence of the feudal law 
 
 Drawing heavily upon the Libri feudorum,111 Craig tells us that while mustering for 
their campaign in Italy, Conrad’s vassals promised to perform deeds of great courage and 
were rewarded with a widening of the feudal law so that, for the first time, the inheritance of 
a feu was extended to grandsons and collaterals without limit. Craig makes clear that this was 
something specifically sought by the vassals; it was not an idea that originated with Conrad, 
although he had no compunction about granting the request because he thought it would 
inspire greater loyalty and bravery among his men. Characteristically, Craig compares the 
mediaeval practice with contemporary Scotland, saying “we see much the same thing happen 
in our country when kings who are either engaged in conflict or about to be are accustomed 
to ready the line of battle by promising their kin wards, reliefs and even ecclesiastical 
                                                 
109 [E]o tempore feudum tantum erat usus fructus alicui servienti sive vasallo et primo ejus heredi sive primi 
gradus heredibus concessus. In fact, texts and law codes from this period show no traces of feudal practice; 
see Gretton, Feudal system (supra, n.23), para. 43 on the conveyancing text Marculfi formulae (660) and the 
Edicta of the Lombard kings Rothair (issued 643) and Liutprand (issued 713-735). 
110 JF 1.4.8. The Libri feudorum does not specify which Emperor Conrad is under discussion; consequently, it 
became a topic of debate among humanists. The controversial word “feudalism” is used here as a shorthand 
for the broader system of law and tenure; the literal English translation of the Latin text (“the adolescence of 
the feu”) would not necessarily convey Craig’s meaning fully. 
111 LF 1.1 
benefices”.112 This is, he says, “a commendable enough arrangement...because the morale of 
the soldiers is encouraged and their zeal is repaid, as they know that no property will be lost 
to those about to die for their country”.113 This comment is more significant than it might at 
first appear, because Craig is explicitly treating military service not as something to which a 
monarch is absolutely entitled but as part of a quid pro quo whereby those who risk their 
lives are to be compensated and those who lose their lives are to be assured that their family 
will not be impoverished. Craig’s feudal sociology depended entirely upon the mutual bonds 
of affection and obligation created by the superior’s generosity and the vassal’s gratitude. As 
he envisioned it, the superior was not some oppressive figure who lorded it over a wretched 
underling;114 rather, both were parties to a specific form of contract that created and depended 
upon obligations of mutual protection, counsel and benevolence.115 It is important that Craig 
did not see this extension of feudal inheritance as in any meaningful way weakening royal 
power; indeed, the widening of inheritance was implicitly limited because only a vassal who 
had accompanied the emperor to Italy could benefit.  
 
 Following these observations on the widening of feudal inheritance, Craig attempts to 
fix the feudal chronology by identifying the Conrad in question, something not specified by 
the Libri feudorum. By the time the Jus feudale was written, the Holy Roman Empire had had 
                                                 
112 [Q]uemadmodum et apud nos fieri videmus, cum in procinctu acies stant, ut reges eorum qui in ea pugna 
sive ad pugnam expeditione morerentur, wardas, relevia et beneficia etiam ecclesiastica propinquioribus 
promittere soleant. 
113 Laudabile sane institutum, nempe ut militum animi confirmentur et acriores reddantur, cum sciant morituris 
pro patria nihil de bonis decessurum. 
114 In Anglophone literature, there has long been a tendency to treat the relationship created by feudal tenure as 
innately oppressive (cf. Dodd, Historical introduction (supra, n.85), p.xl-xli). Indeed, the very first 
appearance of the phrase “feudal system” originated in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) and was 
used to describe an economic system guided by coercion rather than market forces and, with this meaning, it 
was later taken up by Marxists who still use it with this sense (R. Abels, The historiography of a construct: 
“feudalism” and the medieval historian, History Compass, 7 (2009), p.1008-1031, at 1011).  
115 Cf. JF 2.5.8, where Craig discusses these qualities in respect of manrent, although, as Dr. Wormald noted, it 
was never clear whether Craig saw manrent as a feudal arrangement in its own right or whether he thought it 
was a non-feudal exemplification of feudal ideals (J.M. Wormald, Lords and men in Scotland: bonds of 
manrent, 1442-1603, Edinburgh 1985, p.12-13). See also J. Goodare, Nobility and the absolutist state in 
Scotland, 1584-1638, History, 78 (1993) p.161-182 at 163-164, where manrent is described as creating “a 
kind of artificial kin relationship”. I am grateful to Prof. H.L. MacQueen for pointing out that manrent could 
be used as a synonym for homage in the later middle ages, though not limited to that meaning. 
four emperors named Conrad,116 with the first reigning from 911 to 918 and the second 
between 1027 and 1039. Craig reasons that the emperor in question can only have been 
Conrad II because neither Conrad I nor Conrad III were ever said to have made an expedition 
to Italy, while Conrad IV lived long after the composition of the Libri feudorum and therefore 
could not be its subject.117 This is an interesting example of the humanist method for 
establishing chronology, but it is not Craig’s own work. It was actually Dumoulin who first 
identified the emperor mentioned in the Libri feudorum with Conrad II.118 Craig is merely 
following him.  
 
 In a larger sense, Craig does not seem to have been entirely comfortable with some of 
the complexities of humanist periodisation, which may be a reflection of his legal 
background and focus. He clearly felt that neat divisions between historical periods were a 
necessary part of humanistic historiography and thus he divides the life cycle of feudal law 
and tenure into infancy, adolescence, adulthood and senescence; yet he did not execute this 
process of periodisation quite as precisely as some other humanist writers. So, Craig tells us 
that the childhood of feus lasted from 650 until Charlemagne’s reign (1.4.7) and next tells us 
that the adolescence of the feudal law began with Conrad II (1.4.8). However in that same 
section he also says that the adolescence began with Charlemagne and ended with Conrad,119 
with the implication that feudal tenure attained maturity when Conrad extended feus to 
grandsons and collaterals. Later still, he says that feudal tenure did not reach adulthood until 
the Capets made hereditary succession perpetual in France (1.4.11). The likely reason for this 
inconsistency is simply that Craig’s feudal life cycle, although a novel metaphor, did not 
                                                 
116 Strictly, Conrad I was not emperor but merely King of East Francia; it is nevertheless common to treat and 
number him as though he had been the Holy Roman Emperor. 
117 Cf. Craig, Jus feudale (supra, n.18), p.103, n.46 
118 Kelley, De origine feudorum (supra, n.1), p.211 
119 Et huic adolescentiae, si textus verba sequamur, ea tempora assignamus quae a Carolo Magno ad Conradi 
tempora intercesserant (“If we follow the words of the text, we must designate the period between 
Charlemagne and Conrad II as the adolescence of the feudal law.”). 
exactly fit the evolution of feudal practice as he saw it and, as a result, he was not entirely 
clear on where (or, rather, when) to draw the dividing lines between different feudal periods. 
This is not a particularly important issue for Craig’s broader argumentation and it would be 
wrong to dwell on it, but it is interesting as an illustration some of his historiographical 
limitations, some of the places where his product was not quite as polished as he might have 
wished. In broader historiographical, and therefore literary, terms, it shows the discrepancies 
that arose in humanistic historical works precisely because authors were so conscious of the 
different chronological periods into which history had, for epistemological and heuristic 
reasons, been divided and therefore so eager to demonstrate their mastery of history and 
historical writing through the utilisation of their own expressions of periodisation.  
 
 The description of the initial impetus for the heritability of feus – whereby a monarch 
about to depart for a campaign in Italy arranges matters of that his vassals will be succeeded 
by their sons – is extremely reminiscent of the Capitulary of Quierzy promulgated by Charles 
the Bald in similar circumstances in 877.120 Given that Quierzy seems to have been the first 
instance in which the Carolingian monarchs determined that a deceased vassal’s benefice 
should pass to his son as a matter of right, it would appear to be an important and useful 
matter for Craig’s general argumentation and we might have expected him to mention it. The 
fact that he does not is most convincingly explained by his being unaware of its existence. 
Indeed, Craig’s general grasp of Carolingian history is never entirely secure.121 But, 
notwithstanding that Craig was writing about historical events, he was not primarily an 
historian. He was essentially a lawyer writing about historical matters in order to illuminate 
contemporary law and practice. This left certain gaps in his work, some relating to sources 
and others, such as the issues with humanist periodisation, more methodological in nature. 
                                                 
120 On the Capitulary of Quierzy, see Ganshof, Qu’est-ce que la féodalité? (supra, n.70) p.67. 
121 See, for example, JF 1.7.5 where he appears to confuse the Frankish king Charles the Simple with the 
Carolingian emperor Charles the Fat. 
  Moving on, Craig reiterates what he has already said and explains that Conrad’s 
widening of feudal inheritance applied only to ancestral feus (that is, to feus which one had 
inherited from a progenitor) not to novel, or newly-created, feus.122 An ancestral feu 
belonging to a vassal who had accompanied Conrad II to Italy could be inherited by the 
vassal’s brothers, not just by his sons, but novel feus were governed strictly by the terms of 
the feudal grant, meaning that no collateral inheritance could occur unless the superior had 
made specific reference when disponing. So already, in the eleventh century, Craig perceived 
the emergence of distinct, though not wholly divergent, feudal traditions which had created 
different expressions of feudal tenure with different privileges, different obligations and 
therefore fundamentally different expressions of the vassal-superior relationship. It was 
following Conrad’s reign that vassals began to treat their feus as their own personal property 
rather than as land belonging to another; they farmed the land and built upon it “largely 
untroubled by the will of their superiors, so long as they executed their agreed duties”.123 
Once more, this seeming change in attitude is not presented as a weakening of royal power; 
indeed, by articulating that the vassal’s free use of the property was contingent upon the 
fulfilment of feudal obligations, we can infer that Craig construed this as the development, 
not the subversion, of the traditional feudal relationship – and he does, in fact, note that the 
feudal law in this period “matured remarkably”.124 It is important that we understand the full 
linguistic implications here. The Latin verb Craig uses here – adolescere – is, of course, the 
root of adolescentia which can be translated as “maturing” or, as the present author has done, 
as “adolescence”. These word choices give a strong sense of development or evolution, not 
degradation or decay. Following Craig’s metaphor of the feudal life cycle, this is merely a 
single step in the process of juristic development by which customary practice crystallises 
                                                 
122 On the division between ancestral and novel feus, see JF 1.10.13. 
123 [S]ecuri pene de dominorum voluntate, modo servitia conventa praestarent.  
124 [Q]uidem tempore jus feudorum mirum in modum adoleverat (“[The adolescence of feudalism] was a time 
in which the law of feus had matured remarkably.”). 
into its archetypal expression. 
 
 At this point, Craig introduces the alternate hypothesis that the feudal law has a 
Roman origin. This is a topic to which he will return in the succeeding fifth title, so it is not 
immediately clear why he chose to raise the point here as well. Regardless, he explains that 
the Roman emperor Alexander Severus (r. 222-35) had granted lands on the frontiers to 
soldiers “averring that they would be more attentive in their military service if they were also 
defending their own property”.125 From this, “Italians” concluded that there existed “some 
kind of military feu among the Romans, which was descendible to heirs”.126 Hotman makes a 
similar point in his Disputatio and it is certain that Craig had read it.127 However, where 
Hotman mentions in passing that his source is the Roman writer Lampridius, Craig would 
appear to have gone to directly to the primary source because his Latin is so close to that of 
Lampridius that it is practically a quotation. Thus, where Craig says asserens eos attentius 
militaturos si et sua defenderent (“...averring that they would be more attentive in their 
military service if they were also defending their own property”), Lampridius has  dicens 
attentius eos militaturos si etiam sua rura defenderent (“...saying that they would be more 
attentive in their military service if they were, in addition, defending their own fields”). The 
similarity is too pronounced to be a coincidence, so Craig either checked Hotman’s account 
against a text of Lampridius or, at the very least, utilised another source which contained a 
direct quotation. Whichever it may be, we are seeing another instance of Craig’s critical 
historical method. Even where he is heavily dependent upon a source, he is rarely uncritical. 
The main exception to this rule is with Greek language texts where, both due to limited 
linguistic faculty and even more limited availability of Greek editions, he was forced into 
reliance on the reports and quotations of others.128 It would very easy to look at Craig’s 
                                                 
125 ...asserens eos attentius militaturos si et sua defenderent. 
126 Hinc Itali colligunt et apud Romanos feuda quaedam fuisse militaria, quae ad heredes descenderent. 
127 Hotman, Disputatio de jure feudali (supra, n.30), p.15 
128 Cf. Dodd, Craig’s aetiology (supra, n.7), p.129 and 175-177 
reading of European texts and see him as a copyist, particularly since he seems to have been 
bound and determined to present Scots feudal law in terms of the European ius commune,129 
but, for all that he articulates and, indeed, relies upon the opinions of other jurists and 
historians, his treatment of them is discriminating and critical. Whatever his sources, classical 
or contemporary, the analytical work was largely his own and it is impressive for its 
originality and historiographical complexity.  
 
 Among the other points in this section that deserve consideration, it is significant that 
Craig refers to those who advance the Romanist thesis of feudal origins as “Italians”. In fact, 
many of the most important Romanists were not Italian at all, so he is presumably using the 
term to describe scholars who utilised the mos italicus as opposed to those who use the mos 
gallicus (amongst whom would be Craig himself, notwithstanding his use of and reliance on 
many famous mediaeval writers on feudal law); so the point would be to contrast the growing 
historical awareness of humanists with these “Italians” who lumped the Holy Roman Empire 
together with ancient Rome and Byzantium as an undifferentiated whole. Indeed, since Craig 
perceived law as having passed from the ancient Israelites, through Greece and Rome, to 
France whence it was ultimately brought to Scotland,130 it was necessary to demonstrate that 
this process of translatio studii had not involved a weakening of the law’s innate truth. Craig 
is therefore driven to assert that the legal learning derived from France (the mos gallicus or 
what we now call legal humanism) is methodologically superior to the learning of the 
mediaeval Italian jurists.131  
 
                                                 
129 Cairns, Breve testatum (supra, n.32), p.317, n.36; MacQueen, Tears of a legal historian (supra. n.17), p.24 
130 Ford, Law and opinion (supra, n.9), p.211-216 and 222-223; Dodd, Craig’s aetiology (supra, n.7), p.129 
and 175-177. This is not, however, to suggest that Craig ignored or disdained the mediaeval sources on 
feudal law. It was clearly important to Craig to show the ways in which mediaeval authors on the feudal law 
could and should be used to explicate the current practice and historical development of feudal law and 
tenure. Bartolus and Baldus are cited throughout, but the later writer Alvarotto, who originated the idea that 
there existed a common jus feudale from which all later feudal custom derived, is also treated as an 
authoritative source (e.g. JF 1.12.26-27). 
131 These observations are owed entirely to Prof. J. D. Ford, to whom the present author is deeply grateful. 
 It is, in any case, peculiar that Craig should focus so heavily on Lampridius’ account 
when most Romanist scholars, such as Cujas, saw the Roman origins of feudal tenure as 
lying within the Corpus iuris civilis. There is no immediate explanation of this latter point, 
but one might conjecture that Craig simply found the text interesting. From a modern 
perspective, the most important point here is that, whereas jurists advancing a Roman origin 
of feudal law insisted upon the early existence of an articulate form of feudal tenure, Craig 
envisioned an extended process of juristic evolution, from ancient tribal society to a 
developed system of law and tenure. This underlines the sophistication of his historical 
analysis. 
 
The feudal law reaches manhood 
 
 The maturation of the feudal law, as Craig construed it, was the process by which 
feudal tenure became hereditary as a matter of right.132 Hereditary inheritance of feus was 
first attested under Charlemagne, who granted land to soldiers which would then pass to their 
sons, whereas, before this point, feudal tenure had only been lifelong.133 From here, Craig’s 
account takes an interesting and important turn as he explains that Lothair I left an imperial 
constitution on feudal inheritance employing almost exactly the same words as the 
constitution of Conrad Salian. On the basis of this, Hotman, who, as we have said, was 
Craig’s favourite source, concluded that it was Lothair, not Conrad, who first instituted 
hereditary possession of feus.134 Craig’s divergence from Hotman’s account is given in very 
polite terms and he concedes that Hotman “presented many good reasons” for thinking as he 
did, but nevertheless rejects Hotman’s thesis entirely and explains in detail why it is 
incorrect. He says that while feus did pass from vassals to their children as early as the reign 
                                                 
132 Cf. Kelley, De origine feudorum (supra, n.1), p.219: “[H]ereditability...was, as both jurists and historians 
realized, the final stage in the formation of feudal law.” 
133 JF 1.4.10 
134 Hotman, Disputatio de jure feudali (supra, n.30), p.231 
of Charlemagne, this was a privilege proceeding from the kindness of the superior and not a 
matter of right. The privilege of hereditary succession to a feu had become common in 
Lothair’s day, but it was not universal, it was not a legal right and therefore it was not feudal 
law. Hotman’s mistake, as Craig saw it, was in construing specific instances of generosity as 
amounting to a fixed legal rule. However, beyond the specific point about rights of 
succession, this matter demonstrates that, even when dealing with a writer he respected and a 
source he trusted, Thomas Craig was more than capable of striking an independent line. He 
was neither cowed by Hotman’s sterling reputation nor obligated by loyalty to his source.135 
This is true his handling of other sources as well. The mere fact that Craig used and respected 
an author can never be an indication that his thought was identical to that of the author in 
question. Thus we must be wary of trying to discern Craig’s unarticulated opinions by 
excavating them from the sources he used. 
 
 As Craig saw it, genuine hereditary succession to a feu occurred only after the end of 
the Carolingian dynasty, when the Capets took the Frankish throne.136 Wishing to secure the 
loyalty of the magnates, the first two Capet kings, Hugh I and Robert II, made succession to 
feus hereditary. The effect of this was to turn “duchies, counties and baronies” that had 
heretofore been lifelong royal appointments into the perpetual property of a single family;137 
vassals, in Craig’s own words, “now enjoyed the land by right and not by either precarious 
tenure or the whim of another”.138  
Finally feudal tenure had reached the stage that Craig considers manhood, by which he 
means that the privilege of hereditary feudal inheritance had finally crystallised into heritable 
                                                 
135 By the same token, at JF 2.11.10, Craig seems taken aback by the vituperativeness of Hotman’s criticism of 
Obert and Gerardus, the authors of the Libri feudorum, and expresses his belief that Hotman, though “a 
gentleman of the soundest judgment” (vir sane magni judicii), had let himself “get carried away beyond 
what is reasonable by the hatred which he openly displays for the law of feus” (odio, quod in jus feudorum 
aperte Hottomannus profitetur, paulo eum altius, quam par erat, evictum constat). The printed editions of 
the Jus feudale have evectum but the present author feels that evictum makes more sense in context. 
136 JF 1.4.11 
137 Cf. Ganshof, Qu’est-ce que la féodalité? (supra, n.70) p.81. 
138 [N]on precario, neque ex alieno arbitrio, sed jure suo utebantur. 
tenure as a right backed by a framework of legally enforceable custom. Pocock criticised 
Craig for a tendency to see “feudalism” as a centralising force instead of as the decay of royal 
power;139 what we can see here is that Craig’s understanding of the royal-noble power 
dynamic was much more sophisticated and more contextually aware than he has been given 
credit for. In an historical sense, he appears to have been fully aware that the transition to a 
hereditary aristocracy was deleterious for Frankish royal power and he is clear that it came 
about not organically but as a conscious effort on the part of the Capets to secure their hold 
on a throne to which they had only a tenuous claim. As Craig saw it, the growth and 
development of feudal practice, at least in tenth century France, was not about weakening the 
power of monarchy so much as it was about strengthening the political position of the first 
two kings of a new and potentially vulnerable dynasty. In other words, monarchic authority 
over the longer term was traded off for immediate political security. 
 
 The Capets allowed feudal inheritance in the first degree – that is, father to son – but 
“the transition from like to like is easy” and so “the passage of time arranged it so that not 
only brothers but also cousins in the fourth degree could succeed one another”.140 In other 
words, having let the genie out of the bottle by allowing feudal inheritance from father to son, 
it proved impossible to stop the widening of inheritance to encompass other relatives. In time, 
inheritance was extended to any descendent of the feu’s initial grantee, regardless of degree 
of consanguinity to the present holder. In the next section, Craig explains the means for 
calculating degrees of kinship, noting particularly that the canon and civil law use different 
methods and that while feudal law generally follows the civil law, Scottish practice follows 
the canon. The title concludes with the following remark: “This period can be called the 
manhood of feudalism, because the feudal law had acquired these powers for itself to the 
                                                 
139 Pocock, The ancient constitution (supra, n.30), p.87 
140 JF 1.4.12: [C]um facilis a simili in simile sit transitus, fecit progressus temporis ut non solum fratres sed 
etiam patrueles qui in quarto gradu essent ad invicem sibi et mutuo succederent. 
extent that, in matters of succession, the feudal law alone was taken into account; in 
judgments, lawyers followed only the feudal law, ignoring or disregarding the civil or canon 
law, as I said above. Thus the law of feus was born, raised and finally strengthened and 
completed.”141 The manhood – or aetas virilis – of the feudal law was the point at which it 
finally became a unified juristic expression that was accepted by lawyers and utilised in 
practice. 
 
Competing theories 
 
 In the fourth title of Book 1, Craig laid out his basic narrative of European feudal 
history from inception to full maturity. He follows this in the fifth title, the shortest in the 
entire Jus feudale, by setting out, usually without any real editorial comment, the main 
competing theories on the origins of feudal law and tenure. The fifth title opens with a 
condemnation of the recentiores – the more recent legal authors – for their rejection of the 
actual authors of the feudal law and their determination to find some other genesis; as he 
mentions elsewhere, foremost among these recentiores is Cujas.142 All legal humanists, 
recentiores and antiquiores alike, had noted that the Libri feudorum describes the feudal law 
as antiquissimum (‘most ancient’).143 If the law was, indeed, most ancient, then it could not 
have arisen with the Emperor Conrad, who instituted feudal succession a mere 150 years 
before the law was set down in writing by Obert and Gerardus. Where, then, was its actual, 
ancient origin? As we have seen, Craig followed those who found an origin among the 
German tribes described by Tacitus, with the germ of feudal practice being transplanted to the 
                                                 
141 JF 1.4.13: Et haec virilis feudi aetas dici potest, cum eas sibi vires jus feudorum acquisivisset, ut in 
successionibus solum attenderetur; in judiciis illud solum jurisprudentes sequerentur, neglecto sive 
praeterito (ut antea dixi) tam jure civili quam pontificio. Et sic feudorum jus natum et educatum et tandem 
confirmatum et absolutum est. 
142 JF 1.8.10; cf. J.W. Cairns, Ius civile in Scotland, ca. 1600’, Roman Legal Tradition, 2 (2004), p.136-170, at 
151. 
143 LF 1.1.1: Antiquissimo enim tempore sic erat in dominorum potestate connexum. 
ruins of the Roman empire by invading barbarians. The recentiores advanced a great many 
other possible origins for feudal law and tenure, many, though not all, of which involved 
feudal tenure deriving in one way or another from the law and practice of imperial Rome. 
The recentiores often had their own political reasons for the positions they adopted – so, for 
example, some French feudists were reluctant to accept an origin which might imply that 
their own country’s feudal law was derived in any way from constitutions of the German 
emperor, lest this might imply something unfortunate about French royal sovereignty144 – 
but, from Craig’s extremely practical perspective, such issues were abstractions of no direct 
import. Notwithstanding his French legal education, he existed at a distant remove from these 
kinds of issues. He had the luxury of focusing on the plausibility of any given proposition 
rather than on its political or cultural implications. He was, however, aware that there existed 
regional, national and even political biases in favour of specific accounts of the origins of 
feudal law and tenure. 
 
 Italian scholars looked for the origins of the feudal law in the Roman tradition of 
clientage.145 As we noted earlier, most of those advancing a Roman origin narrative were 
not actually Italian by nationality, so it is likely that Craig is describing these scholars as 
practitioners of the mos italicus and thereby trying to contrast the nuanced French 
humanist understanding of history and periodisation with the older tendency to treat 
history as an undifferentiated whole. Craig then cites one of these “Italians”, the French 
humanist Budé whose 1508 commentary on the Digest first articulated the possibility that 
the feudal law could have evolved from the Roman custom of clientage. Those who 
followed this position saw the Roman patron as analogous to the feudal superior and the 
client to the vassal; what Romans called faith (fides) evolved into fealty (fidelitas), with 
                                                 
144 Kelley, De origine feudorum (supra, n.1), p.214-215. The fact that the Libri feudorum contained so much 
legislation from successive emperors is a partial explanation for the text’s importance in Germany; see 
Heirbaut, Feudal law (supra, n.19), p.537-538. 
145 JF 1.5.2 
both feudal tenure and clientage marked by mutual honour, aid and respect. Others, Craig 
explains, preferred the idea that feudal tenure began with the Roman imperial policy of 
granting lands taken from conquered foes to military veterans who had completed their 
service.146 This is the longest section of the fifth title and bears closer inspection, if only 
because Craig himself seems to have found it interesting. He illustrates the Romanist 
argument with examples taken from classical Latin literature; thus, he recounts a story in 
which Octavius (the future Augustus), after winning the civil war against Mark Antony 
and Lepidus, punished the city of Cremona for disloyalty by granting some of its lands to 
his veterans. When these proved insufficient, he annexed land from Mantua, which 
unfortunately included the ancestral estate of the Roman poet Vergil,147 who then, after 
being chased off at sword point by the centurion to whom the farm had been given, was 
compelled to go to Rome and ask Octavius directly for relief. This is a colourful story and 
one can understand why Craig might enjoy telling it, but he introduces further examples 
from Horace and Lucan in which Roman soldiers were or were not given lands to which 
they felt they had a right on the basis of their military service.148 As he did in the previous 
title,149 Craig brings up the example of Alexander Severus, the Roman emperor who 
settled soldiers on the frontier, and draws the comparison between this and the Turkish 
timar. However, Craig draws a very important distinction between Roman and feudal 
practice: the Romans gave land to soldiers who had completed their military service 
(“Only veterans founded colonies in this way, men who had grown old either advancing or 
defending the honour of the Senate”).150 The obvious implication – that feus were given to 
fighting men in return for their ongoing loyalty, not for historical service – is not 
something upon which Craig dwells here, though he does expand on this point a few pages 
                                                 
146 JF 1.5.3 
147 Vergil, Eclogae, 9.28 
148 Horace, Sermones, 2.6.55-6; Lucan, Pharsalia, 1.343-6 
149 JF 1.4.9 
150 Soli tamen antea veterani deducebantur qui pro dignitate senatus aut promovenda aut conservanda 
consenuerant. 
later.151 
 
 In concluding this section, Craig comments that “[t]here are many who think it is 
relevant that Romans were accustomed to give benefices as a gift (that is, lands, cities and 
even kingdoms captured from enemies) to those kings whom they had accepted in 
friendship.”152 He illustrates this by reference to stories in which Roman allies had been 
given land as a reward for loyalty: first, the Numidian king Massinissa who fought for Rome 
against Carthage and received extra territory in return; then the Aedui tribe in Gaul who were 
allied with Julius Caesar and received in return the territory of the neighbouring Hedui; and 
Tasgetius, a magnate of the Carnutes who, with Caesar’s help, deposed his rivals and became 
king. These accounts, though, are only superficially akin to feudal practice; the greatest 
similarity to the European feudal archetype, he says, is to be found in a speech to the Roman 
senate by Adherbal, grandson of Massinissa, reported in Sallust’s book on the Jugurthine 
War,153 in which the Numidian king acknowledged that he ruled not in his own right but as a 
steward on behalf of Rome, something which Craig saw as akin to the duplex dominium of 
classical feudal theory. All of this material, including the speech quoted from Sallust, has 
been taken from Hotman’s feudal commentary.154 This is not surprising, given the deep 
respect that Craig felt for Hotman’s scholarship, but it does blur the boundary between 
Craig’s own original thought and that of Hotman; at worst, it could lead one to suspect that 
Craig is no more than a vehicle for expressing his source’s opinion. What must be recognised 
here, and throughout his treatment of feudal history, is that Craig was not the first writer to 
deal with the topics under discussion. Whatever the specific purpose he envisioned for the 
Jus feudale in its Scottish context, the book was, in a wider sense, the means by which Craig 
                                                 
151 At JF 1.5.9.  
152 JF 1.5.3: Plerisque huc pertinere videtur, quod Romani regibus, quos in amicitiam receperant, beneficia, id 
est, agros, urbes, etiam regna ex hostibus capta, dono dare solebant. 
153 Sallust, Bellum Iugurthinum, 14 
154 Hotman, Disputatio de jure feudali (supra, n.30), p.9-10 
dipped his toe into a series of long-running scholarly disputes – some of which had begun 
decades before Craig was even born – and the entire fifth title, amounting as it does to the 
summary of most of the existing theories for the origins of feudal law and tenure, is the 
firmest possible evidence of this fact. His dependence on Hotman signified not a lack of 
originality but a simple need to summarise accurately and succinctly the accretion of 
humanist learning on the topic. 
 
 Moving on, Craig next deals with the theory of a Celtic or Gallic origin, the main 
evidence for which is a remark from Caesar’s account of the conquest of Gaul describing the 
soldurii, a select group of warriors who pledged themselves to a chieftain and, in return, 
received their living from him.155 This was the theory advanced by François Connan, though 
it never gained much traction.156 Here, too, Craig is borrowing from Hotman who, just a few 
pages after his discussion of the Numidian kings, discusses the theory of a Gallic or Romano-
Gallic origin for feudal tenure and deploys precisely the same quotation from Caesar that 
Craig uses; they differ only in that Hotman specifically attributes the Celtic theory to the 
“most learned gentleman” François Connan, saying that he “argues that the custom of 
feudalism spread from the Gauls to the Germans, Spanish, Italians and the other peoples of 
Europe”,157 whereas Craig does not mention Connan by name.158 This is probably most easily 
explained if we consider that Connan’s theory was not a particularly important one, either in 
Craig’s day or subsequently, so it was enough to acknowledge its existence and move on; by 
                                                 
155 JF 1.5.4, citing Caesar, De bello Gallico, 3.22. Soldurii is a Celtic loanword which some classicists have, 
unhelpfully, translated as ‘vassals of a chieftain’: see C.B. Krebs, A style of choice, in: The Cambridge 
companion to the writings of Julius Caesar, eds. L. Grillo and C.B. Krebs, Cambridge 2018, p.110-130, at 
126. One nineteenth century translation actually describes them as “persons lying under feudal obligations” 
(W.A. McDevitte and W.S. Bohn, Caesar’s commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars, New York 1870, 
p.78, n.1). By contrast, the institutional writer Erskine, possessed of a more nuanced understanding of feudal 
law, was able to say decisively that the relationship between soldurii and their chiefs “was in no respect 
feudal” and proceeded “not from feudal obligations, or oaths of fidelity, but from the affection which all of 
the same tribe have to their head or chieftain” (J. Erskine, An institute of the law of Scotland, 2.3.2 [= vol.1, 
p. 298 in the 1871 Edinburgh two-volume edition]). 
156 Kelley, The rise of legal history (supra, n.4), p.189-190 
157 Hotman, Disputatio de jure feudali, 14: Quod vero Franc. Connanus vir doctissimus disputat feudorum 
morem a Gallis ad Germanos, Hispanos, Italos, et alios Europae populos venisse. 
158 He does, however, cite Connan approvingly and by name elsewhere; e.g., JF 1.12.12. 
contrast, in the previous section, Craig was dealing with the much more popular and much 
more important Romanist theory which demanded explication at greater length. In the next 
section, Craig mentions the idea of a Spanish origin, based upon material found in Plutarch 
and Valerius Maximus.159 This too is discussed by Hotman and the same classical sources are 
cited.160 Given that Craig’s Greek was not ideal and that Valerius is a relatively obscure 
author, it is probably not uncharitable if we assume that he would been unaware of the 
contents of either text if not for Hotman. 
 
 From Spain, Craig progresses to Germany and the idea that the origins of feudal 
tenure can be found in Tacitus’ Germania.161 The treatment here is limited, because, as he 
says, this is material which was examined earlier in much greater detail. Were one to read this 
section in isolation, it would not be immediately clear that this theory is one to which Craig 
was deeply attached, indeed, one which he considered self-evidently true. This title as a 
whole serves as a basic review of feudal thought; its broad didactic function is to introduce a 
predominantly Scottish readership to the trends of humanist thinking on the origins of feudal 
law and tenure. Hence Craig feels no need to labour points or go into great detail. From 
Germany, Craig surprisingly proceeds to Greece where it is claimed that the feudal law 
originated with a decree of the Byzantine emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus who 
ruled from 912 until his death in 959. Given that, by the time Craig was writing, the whole of 
Greece was under the rule of the Ottoman Turks, it seems peculiar to suppose that the origins 
of feudal tenure were a matter of much importance to anyone in that country. Moreover, the 
Byzantines never developed feudalism in the Western European sense, having, instead, a 
superficially similar system called pronoia.162 Craig’s source on this cannot be Hotman, since 
                                                 
159 JF 1.5.5, citing Plutarch, Sertorius, 14 and Valerius Maximus, Dicta memorabilia, 2.6.11. 
160 Hotman, Disputatio de jure feudali (supra, n.30), 15 
161 JF 1.5.6 
162 Regarding which, see W. Treadgold, A history of the Byzantine state and society, Stanford, 1997, p.680-681. 
Marxist and historical materialist scholars do, in fact, argue that Byzantium was a feudal society because it 
was “dominated by feudal relations of production” (J. Haldon, The feudalism debate once more: the case of 
his work does not mention Greece or the Greeks in connexion with feudal law or tenure. It 
seems most likely that he was drawing upon Cujas whose commentary on the Libri feudorum 
describes a novella or constitution of Constantine Porphyrogenitus which mentions the 
holding of estates (praedia militaria) in return for military service (onus militiae).163 The fact 
that Craig could switch so fluidly from Hotman’s work to that of Cujas shows something 
about the availability of humanist texts for a Scottish lawyer in this period;164 therefore, it 
reveals something about the breadth of Craig’s reading and indicates, again, that his treatment 
of feudal origins should be seen as both corollary and response to Continental humanist 
jurisprudence and historiography.165  
 
 In the next section, Craig delivers his response to the various theories he has just 
summarised. Showing once more his keen awareness of anachronism and periodisation, he 
tells us that none of these theories can fully explain the origins of feudal tenure because, prior 
to the barbarian invasions of the Roman empire, no instances of feudal terminology or 
practice are to be found; as Craig sees it, feudal tenure requires a specific form of language to 
describe it and a specific form of custom to govern it, so it follows that the earliest point at 
which feudal tenure could have existed is the point at which feudal concepts like fealty, 
homage, investiture and duplex dominium can be shown to have existed.166 It is also in this 
section that Craig explains why so many different theories for the origin of feudal tenure and 
law exist; from his Scottish perspective, the fault lies with misplaced patriotism. Learned 
men invent arguments that flatter their own countries. This is a short comment, but reflects 
some of the issues Craig wrestled with as a British unionist. In writing this section, he was 
                                                 
Byzantium, Journal of Peasant Studies 17 (1989), p.5-40, at 16), by which is meant a system where an elite 
class dominated the productive class and absorbed any surplus production. 
163 Cujas, De feudis libri quinque, Montréal, 1567, p.10 (but p.8 of the 1588 Cologne edition). 
164 In the sixteenth century, law books were often brought back from the Continent by students who had 
completed their studies and these were often traded and loaned between legal practitioners; see J. Finlay, 
Men of law in pre-reformation Scotland, East Linton 2000, p.88. 
165 Cf. J. Irvine Smith, The transition to the modern law 1532-1660, part I: the general development of Scots 
law, in An introduction to scottish legal history [=Stair Society, vol. 20], Edinburgh 1958, p.25-43, at 31 
166 JF 1.5.8 
presumably thinking about some of the same issues that he addressed in his treatise De 
hominio (‘On homage’) where he used arguments about feudal chronology to disprove the 
old English canard that Scotland was a liege feu of England.167 The sole English translation 
of the De hominio, by George Ridpath in 1695, was titled Scotland’s Sovereignty Asserted 
and, while one can construe the work in that way, from Craig’s point of view, it was the 
English historians who were asserting something; he was merely correcting them. 
Regardless, one can see that he was deeply conscious that patriotic bias could lead to the 
misuse of history, whether through deliberate distortion or simple partiality. 
 
 The final section is a refutation of all the theories laid out in the rest of the title.168 A 
Roman origin for feudal tenure is discounted because, as Craig sees it, clientage in the 
ancient world has none of the distinct characteristics that he associates with feudal practice: 
clients had no obligation of military service; patrons had no obligation to provide material 
benefits for their clients and nor did they exercise jurisdiction; and there was no oath of 
fealty. Whatever clientage may have been, it was not feudal. Nor can the Roman policy of 
giving land to veterans be construed as feudal, because veterans were men who had already 
completed their service whereas feus were given to young men whose military service lay 
ahead of them. Further, the land received by Roman veterans had been taken from conquered 
foes. The feudal practice involved vassals receiving land that already belonged to their lord or 
king. The absence of oaths of fealty is again a decisive argument: since Roman veterans 
swore no oaths, as demanded by the feudal law, their tenure cannot have been feudal. The 
constitution of Constantine VII is easily brushed aside on grounds that it dates to the year 912 
and is therefore too recent to mark the beginning of feudal law or tenure. Indeed, Craig notes 
that it is possible that the Greeks could have appropriated their own feudal practice from the 
                                                 
167 See Dodd, Historical introduction (supra, n.85), p.xxiii-xiv and C. Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s past: 
Scottish Whig historians and the creation of an Anglo-British identity, Cambridge, 1993, p.44. 
168 JF 1.5.9 
laws of Charlemagne or his grandson Lothair. On the basis of all of this, he asserts, the only 
plausible source for feudal law and tenure in Europe is ancient Germany, as described by 
Tacitus, whence, following the invasion of the Roman empire, feudal customs spread to the 
whole of Christendom. Perhaps the single most interesting aspect of this section is that Craig 
is indirectly providing a kind of checklist of the features he considers intrinsically feudal. In 
effect, by telling us that an origin narrative must be incorrect because it lacks this or that 
characteristic, he is revealing the features that he understood as inherent to feudal tenure and 
law. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In examining Thomas Craig’s treatment of the origins of feudal law and tenure, we 
have seen throughout that he was merely one link in a long of chain of feudal lawyers 
stretching all the way back to Baldus. His work drew upon a vast body of literature, classical, 
mediaeval and modern. He not only employed primary sources, such as Tacitus, but relied 
upon humanistic interpretative literature, such as that of Hotman and Bodin. One may 
wonder why this matters so much, given that anyone who has actually read the Jus feudale 
will have seen a battery of references, citations and, on more than a few occasions, 
recommendations for further reading. To say that Craig was merely one writer among many 
could be a statement of the obvious. Yet outside the fields of law and legal history. Craig has 
been sometimes presented, usually in negative terms, as the inventor or originator of various 
aspects of feudal law and theory. So it is that the mediaeval historian Elizabeth Brown 
singled Craig out for harsh criticism and blamed him for creating the idea of a pyramidal 
feudal system and then communicating it to future generations of historians through the Jus 
feudale.169 Elsewhere Craig has been described as an antiquarian at the Stuart court who 
                                                 
169 Brown, Tyranny of a construct, (supra, n.86), p.1064. Craig’s explanation of the origins of feudal tenure is 
very similar in several respects to that of François Ganshof and it is certainly interesting to read Ganshof’s 
discovered the feudal law and introduced it to James VI, thereby informing the king’s 
understanding of monarchy.170 Other examples abound and they are all fundamentally in 
error because they fail to appreciate the literary and juristic contexts within which Craig was 
writing. 
 
 Not only was the Jus feudale dependent upon Continental scholarship, it was also an 
explicit attempt to bring feudal theory from the law schools of France to the law courts of 
Scotland. The treatise was in part intended to forge an intellectual link between the European 
mainstream, represented especially by France, and a peripheral kingdom that was neither 
wealthy nor politically important. What makes Craig unique is that he was the first Scot and 
Briton to apply himself to the question of the feudal law’s place within the wider framework 
of Scots law; and therefore to the question of Scots law’s place within the wider framework 
of the ius commune. Craig was the first to articulate and explore the notion that both Scots 
and English law were best understood within a European context and that, therefore, 
European juristic theory was a useful key to unlock the interpretation of British law. Beyond 
that, Craig was also the first British lawyer to employ the critical methodologies of 
Continental legal humanism in a comprehensive fashion, the first to use those methodologies 
in the production of a major treatise, and, indeed, the first Scot to create a comprehensive 
study of law. While Scottish intellectuals of the sixteenth century were avid consumers of the 
European humanist product, they were not, with a few notable exceptions like Buchanan, 
major contributors to the common pool of European learning. Craig’s Jus feudale represents 
an attempt to change that, at least in the field of law.  
                                                 
Qu’est-ce que la féodalité? (supra, n.70) alongside Craig’s account. The similarities between Craig and the 
modern mediaevalists against whom Brown railed may explain her assumption that the Jus feudale was, in 
some way, the original source of the construct of feudalism and that Craig bore final responsibility for 
misleading modern mediaeval historians into believing that feudal social relations were a pyramidal 
structure uniformly present across every part of Europe. 
170 J.E. Berg, Gorboduc as a tragic discovery of “feudalism”, Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 40 
(2000), p.199-226, at 201-2 
  This self-conscious commitment to the humanist historiographical method is, by 
itself, enough to explain Craig’s focus on the origins not only of the feudal law but of law and 
society generally. The humanist writers by whom Craig was so deeply influenced considered 
origins to be a central component in the writing and interpretation of history and so, in 
writing a humanistic text, Craig could not have done other than follow the epistemological 
and literary structures that they laid down. There is, though, another reason, specific to Craig, 
for exploring law’s origins. As Prof. Ford has shown, the concept of translatio studii underlay 
Thomas Craig’s understanding of and approach to law and history.171 Law had its divinely-
inspired origin in Biblical Israel and from there had passed, via ancient Egypt, to Greece and 
Rome and then to the law schools of early modern France whence not only law, but also the 
interpretative or heuristic mechanisms of humanistic legal thought, were brought to Scotland 
by jurists like Craig.172 The study of feudal origins served several different but 
complementary functions. It provided the practising lawyer with historical precedent. It 
showed the way that this law, which straddled the line between ius proprium and ius 
commune, had developed over time until crystallising into specific local expressions.173 It 
connected Scots law and Scots lawyers with European feudal legal theory. Ultimately, it 
served to establish an ongoing institutional basis for future historico-legal thought in Scotland 
by uniting history and law beneath the humanist method. 
                                                 
171 Ford, Law and opinion (supra, n.9), p.50-51 
172 Ibid., p.222-223 
173 Ibid. p.494; Dodd, Historical introduction (supra, n.85), p.xxx-xxxi 
